

Beyond the 'New Horizon'

Proceedings from the
UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar
Geneva, 23–24 June 2010

Edited by Cedric de Coning, Andreas Øien Stensland
and Thierry Tardy



Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Department of Security and Conflict Management

Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
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ISBN: 978-82-7002-292-2

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Andreas Øien Stensland

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Jointly organized by the ***Norwegian Institute of International Affairs***
and the ***Geneva Centre for Security Policy*** in partnership with the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Funded by the **Governments of Norway and Switzerland**

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Abbreviations

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AU PSOD	African Union Peace Support Operations Division
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AU PST	African Union Peacekeeping Support Team
C-34	United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping
CCAC	Cross-Cutting 'Western' Agendas Cluster
CISAR	China International Search and Rescue Team
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
EUFOR Chad/CAR	European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
FARDC	Democratic Republic of Congo Armed Forces
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy

GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IEC	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group External Classification
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP	National Congress Party (Sudan)
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
SHIRBAT	Standing High Readiness mission-planning and headquarters Battalion
SHIRBRIG	Standing High Readiness mission-planning and headquarters Brigade
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries

UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDFS	United Nations Department of Field Services
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States Dollar
ZIF	Center for International Peace Operations (Berlin)

Beyond the ‘New Horizon’: A Seminar on the Future Challenges of UN Peacekeeping

Cedric de Coning, Andreas Øien Stensland
and Thierry Tardy

The past decade has seen a nine-fold increase in UN peacekeeping operations. With over 123,000 deployed personnel across 16 missions, and at a cost of approximately USD 8 billion per year, the scale of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping today is unprecedented.¹ While prior reforms have enabled growth and helped to define the core strengths of operations, UN peacekeeping now finds itself, once again, at a crossroads: ‘The scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are straining its personnel, administrative and support machinery.’² The peacekeeping partnership is under stress – among contributors, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat. Several current peacekeeping missions are deployed beyond their doctrinal and capacity comfort zones.³

Missions are also facing several challenges on the operational level. First, they are struggling with the implementation of new assigned tasks, such as the protection of civilians, linking peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and interpreting what is meant by a ‘robust’ approach. The absence of clear

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1. UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, DPI/2429/Rev.7, March 2010, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf>, accessed on 30 August 2010.
 2. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations, 2009: ii. [hereinafter *New Horizon*]
 3. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000 [the Brahimi Report] and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations, 2008: 19.

guidelines on some of these new tasks, as well as the lack of consensus among member states on the appropriate role of UN peacekeeping in others, has hindered missions from accomplishing some of these objectives. Second, political peace processes are weak or undermined in several mission settings (Darfur, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc.), which challenges the underlying assumptions of the ‘peace’-keeping doctrine. Third, missions are experiencing increasing conditionality, or in some cases even formal withdrawal of consent, by host-state parties (Chad, DRC, Sudan). Fourth, in the absence of post-settlement peacebuilding solutions, missions are experiencing difficulties in delivering effective transition and exit strategies (Timor-Leste, Côte d’Ivoire, pre-earthquake Haiti).

Those characteristics are constant challenges of contemporary peacekeeping operations. They are also at the genesis of the non-paper ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’. Released to member states and peacekeeping partners in July 2009, the document was prepared by the UN Secretariat to ‘support a reinvigorated dialogue with the aim of forging a peacekeeping policy agenda that reflects the perspectives of all stakeholders in the global peacekeeping partnership.’⁴ The non-paper proposes a new agenda, envisioning a partnership in purpose, in action and for the future. Such a partnership ‘rests on a shared understanding among all stakeholders of the objectives of UN peacekeeping’ where a ‘common vision and mutual accountability of all peacekeeping partners are the basis for unity of purpose and effective action.’⁵

The New Horizon non-paper has stimulated a rich debate in various UN member-state bodies, the UN Secretariat and its missions, as well as the broader peacekeeping community. Since its release, a dialogue has taken place between the Secretariat, the member states and regional partners that has helped identify a set of common priorities to strengthen peacekeeping. In the meantime, there are several important facets of contemporary peace-

4. The non-paper was prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) and it was released in the context of the ‘New Horizon’ process of developing a forward agenda for UN peacekeeping.

5. New Horizon, footnote 2.

keeping practice that were not explored in depth in the context of the 'New Horizon' non-paper, or that have emerged subsequently.

Beyond the 'New Horizon'

It is with such issues in mind that the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), in partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), organized the 'UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar' in Geneva from 23 to 24 June 2010. The seminar was arranged as a closed invitation roundtable, bringing together researchers from across the globe, as well as policy staff from DPKO, other UN agencies and the African Union (AU).

The objective was to facilitate a dialogue among the research and policy community and stimulate frank discussion on the range of factors most likely to influence and direct peacekeeping developments over the next few years, including and beyond, the agenda set by the 'New Horizon' non-paper. The organizers, in consultation with DPKO, identified several key issues, and then invited one presenter and two discussants to introduce each issue, but the bulk of the time was dedicated to moderated discussions. The overall aim was to bring together a diverse group of peacekeeping experts from across the globe, representing different geo-political, socio-cultural, and policy-research perspectives, so that together they could raise each other's awareness and understanding of the future challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations to another level.

Key Future Challenges

Over six sessions, the seminar used the following entry-point topics to debate the key future challenges facing UN peacekeeping:

- the trend towards increasing conditionality and/or withdrawal of consent by host governments and other parties to a conflict;
- options for increasing the number of civilian and military personnel available for UN peacekeeping missions, and for engaging contributors in decisions regarding the kinds of capabilities that need to be developed for future challenges;

- the role of host population perceptions and expectations in terms of UN peacekeeping credibility and accountability;
- the challenges of conceptualizing and operationalizing doctrinal approaches such as ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘protection of civilians’;
- future options for partnership and support between the UN and the AU.

This report is an edited volume of the presentations delivered at the seminar to introduce each of these topics. In addition, the volume contains a background paper on the role of China in UN peacekeeping. The programme and list of participants are attached as annexes. This first chapter introduces the debate and gives an overview of some of the key issues raised.

Managing Consent

Managing the ongoing consent amongst the parties to the conflict, including especially the host government with whom the mission is legally contracting, is a challenge that goes back to the birth of multidimensional peacekeeping. Recently, UN peacekeeping missions have experienced serious challenges to – or even direct withdrawal of – consent in Burundi, Chad, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea and in Darfur. Ian Johnstone’s paper presents the partnership between the host government and the UN as a relational contract, one in which the content of the contract emerges from the interactions throughout the relationship. He argues that the UN’s leverage towards the host state is at its highest at the start of a mission. Over time, a strengthened host government and the waning will of the intervening countries, combine to undermine the leverage of the UN. Johnstone’s contribution raises important questions as to how the UN can use its leverage to remain engaged across the multidimensional spectrum, without looking and behaving like an unwelcome occupation force.

Whose consent matters – that of the parties to the conflict or that of the affected population? Some argued in the seminar that the concept of local ownership, although an important principle, is difficult to define, and even more difficult to measure. Closely related, especially in some cases, is the dilemma of engaging with spoilers or ‘untouchable’ elements, such as groups identified by the international community as ‘terrorist groups’. This issue becomes even more complex in situations where such groups have demonstrated public support, e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon, or where they represent an important political

faction in the political process. For the contract on consent to be effective, it has to be established not only with the groups acceptable to the international community, but with all key stakeholders in the peace process.

Others argued that the UN's leverage hinges not only on its actions on the ground, but also on its role in representing the will of the international community – an international community to which the host government wishes to remain a legitimate member. In this context, active political support from a strong majority in the Security Council, especially among the permanent members, is essential to managing the consent of the parties.

In some cases, UN peacekeeping missions do not face a formal withdrawal of consent, but are instead confronted with an incremental, but determined effort to frustrate the work of the mission through bureaucratic and procedural obstacles used by host governments to signal their de facto withholding of consent. In these cases, the UN has had to choose between withdrawal, which would most likely place the host population at risk, and more intrusive missions, which also poses risks, not least to the host population. Usually, the choice has been to continue to try to execute the mandate as effectively as possible under less than ideal circumstances, whilst at the same time trying to manage consent through strategic pressure and other means. The relationship between the UN and the government of Sudan in the context of Darfur is a case in point.

Some argued that the current working method of renewing mandates on an annual basis leaves the UN at the mercy of the host governments. The point was therefore made that protection mandates should be issued against benchmarks, not time-frames. This would not remove the obligation to review progress regularly, but it would shift the focus from obtaining the consent of the host government to a discussion on the results achieved over the relevant time-period.

Expanding and Engaging TCCs and Civilian Contributors: Towards a Capability-driven Approach to Peacekeeping

According to the 'New Horizon' non-paper, a broad-based, global participation underpins legitimacy and strong partnership. More equitable par-

ticipation and contribution of troops, police and civilians to peacekeeping operations will enable a more collective burden-sharing and help build a shared understanding of the challenges to be met.⁶ Today, however, the perception of the peacekeeping experience varies greatly, depending on the three following categories of states: those in which large-scale peace operations are deployed (mainly in Africa); those supplying the bulk of peacekeeping forces (most notably in South Asia and Africa); and those providing most of the funding for peace operations (the United States, European Union (EU) members and Japan).⁷

This informal 'division of tasks' gives rise to several concerns. For instance, some argue that the latter group of mostly Western states are using the former group, mostly from the global South, in an effort to ensure that the countries emerging out of conflict, who are also predominantly in the South, adopt liberal democratic or neo-liberal forms of government.

Don Daniel's contribution investigates the feasibility of expanding and engaging the pool of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to UN peace operations. Discussions focused on the importance of the quality – rather than quantity – of contributions. This demands increased attention to the comparative advantages of every potential contributing country and an increased focus on training and experience-sharing mechanisms. Various questions were raised related to the different potential avenues open to the UN to expand the pool of potential contributors. For instance, how can the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping missions be made more attractive to states that have the capacity, but traditionally have not participated in UN peacekeeping – as is the case with several countries in the Gulf and more generally in the Middle East? Others asked whether an eventual NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would result in more Western countries participating in UN operations in future.

6. New Horizon, footnote 2.

7. See Gowan, Richard. 'The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis', 2006–08. *International Peacekeeping* 15, no 4, 2008: 453–69.

Civilian Capacities in UN Peace Operations

New peacekeeping tasks also require a high number of civilian specialists – a group often in limited supply both at home and abroad. Civilians now represent approximately 20% of all UN peacekeepers. This change has come about as mandates changed from monitoring military ceasefires to supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. Cedric de Coning's contribution discusses the challenges related to this shift, most notably the problems with recruitment and deployment to UN missions. Despite the high number of people willing to serve in UN missions, the organization suffers from high vacancy rates. He argues that by improving the link between training, rostering and recruitment, the UN should be able to enhance a more capability-driven approach to strengthening the civilian capacity for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

During seminar discussions, it was proposed that UN member states should consider how the structural shortcomings in the existing recruitment procedures of the UN Secretariat can be reformed. Some called for revisiting the proposal to create a standing capacity of UN peacekeeping personnel. Such a group would form a core cadre of professional peacekeepers that could be moved among missions, without the UN system having to appoint new staff, or issue new contracts every time. This would ease the pressure on new recruitments, make investment in training more worthwhile, and in general result in a more professional cadre of civilian peacekeeping personnel with a sustained interest in improving the overall capability and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. Such a cadre of professional civilian peacekeeping personnel should place an emphasis on gender balance and reflect the type of socio-cultural background – including language skills, experiences and knowledge – relevant for the types of missions the UN is engaged with at a particular time-period.

Concern was expressed about the potential negative side-effects of further increasing the number of civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions. These included the danger of creating parallel institutions that undermine the very local government capacities these missions are mandated to build and support, as well as contributing to brain-drain by hiring a sizable percentage of knowledgeable and experienced personnel to work for international organi-

zations. The option of embedding international staff in local government structures, rather than with the UN mission, was discussed, as was its many complicated side-effects. Another consideration was increasing the use of expertise in the diaspora, although, as the discussion showed, this option is not always ideal and can also have a range of unintended consequences. The discussion also considered the importance of building local civilian capacity and the role UN peacekeeping missions can play in this regard.

Assessing Host Population Perceptions and Expectations

Building partnerships does not only mean engaging the host government in constructive peacekeeping efforts. It also requires engagement with the population of the host state. However, critical debate on the local impact of peacekeeping, and particularly on host perceptions and expectations, was found wanting. In his contribution to this volume, Michael Pugh argues that sovereignty, local agency and perceptions, as well as the accountability of local leaders, must be taken seriously for peacekeeping missions to be legitimate and effective. After all, it is the host communities themselves that must live with – and support – the volatile and untidy peace that will last long after the peacekeepers have gone.

Discussions focused on the unintended consequences, both positive and negative, of the presence of peacekeeping missions. Personnel in UN operations must be aware that their choices create winners and losers in host communities. Moreover, local communities do not simply passively accept what the peacekeeping mission has to offer. They may resist some and incorporate other parts of the peacekeeping missions' message, depending on their own needs and perceptions, and as a way of instrumentalizing the peacekeeping presence in their own lives. Monitoring local perceptions will assist the peacekeeping mission with understanding how its messages are received and what effects the mission's messaging and actions may be having.

Another theme that was touched on is the complexity of identifying local counterparts, and thereby influencing which local needs and expectations will be listened to. Another was the difficulty of understanding local context: whilst local communities usually want physical and moral security, restoration of rights, property and dignity, sustainable livelihoods and employment, their understanding of these issues may be very different from those

of the peacekeepers. For instance, a society may need and thus cooperate with peacekeepers on protection issues, but reject initiatives to reform their traditional justice systems, even if, in the view of the peacekeepers, the justice system is linked to protection risks. Another example from the district of Abyei in Sudan that was shared at the seminar is indicative of the kind of capacities and coping strategies that local communities may employ. In this case, the local community did not ask for direct protection from the UN peacekeepers. Rather, they wished to know how the UN mission would react if there was an outbreak of hostilities – so that they could plan their own responses accordingly.

Robust Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians

Over the last decade, the mandates of authorized UN operations have usually included wording that provides these missions with the authority to use force, among other to protect civilians in imminent threat of physical violence. Whilst many view this as a welcome and much-needed development, others are concerned with some of the implications. Two inter-related aspects of particular concern are whether these new mandates require UN missions to use force differently than before; and the means through which these missions are intended to achieve the protection of civilians.

Discussions focused on the issue of robust peacekeeping, understood both as a broad concept relating to a firm political stance of key stakeholders vis-à-vis a peacekeeping mandate and as a more narrow idea articulated around the possible use of force in mandate implementation.

Robustness is supposed to allow a peacekeeping operation to protect itself, to ensure some freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate or more broadly the peace process is taken hostage by spoilers. However, those that promote robust peacekeeping have not been able to articulate the concept clearly enough to convince those who express concerns about it – and these are generally the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – of what it entails and why it is necessary. The NAM countries have criticized the concept for its lack of clarity, and have questioned some of its underlying assumptions, for instance that more robustness necessarily implies greater effectiveness. Some in the C-34

also suggest that peacekeeping already acts robustly and therefore question the need for a change and/or further conceptual definition.

With regard to the use of force, some argue that the minimum use of force remains one of the three key principles of UN peacekeeping, and that the use of force, including to protect civilians, must be a last resort. Others hold that the UN should adopt a new, more 'robust' approach to peacekeeping, which implies a new willingness to use force where necessary to achieve the mission's protection mandate. This also implies that the way in which peacekeeping missions are managed and commanded, and the way in which their forces are structured, equipped and trained, must change accordingly.

Thierry Tardy's contribution questions the coherence and feasibility of the concept of robust peacekeeping, particularly the extent to which the concept is politically acceptable and operationally viable. Beyond the doctrinal difficulty of ensuring compatibility of robustness with the principles of peace operations, robust peacekeeping is directly challenged by long-lasting constraints of contemporary peace operations, such as weak political support, erratic availability and quality of troops, and reticence of the troop contributors to embrace a robust approach. Also, although the C-34 eventually agreed on the need for an intensified dialogue on deterrence of threats through a particular posture, deliberations in the C-34 indicated that the NAM countries are reluctant towards robust peacekeeping – particularly with all its current connotations. This, however, does not mean that they are opposed to the use of force for protection.

Seminar discussions stressed the importance of not confining the debate about robustness to the use of force, and to include its political dimensions, as does the 'New Horizon' non-paper. In the meantime, discussions revealed scepticism towards the concept of 'robustness'. Some of the panellists proposed to change the name to 'effective peacekeeping' (as suggested by some of the NAM countries), as this would call attention to effectiveness rather than the implicit reference to the use of force. Several argued that the whole idea of robust peacekeeping has become so politicized, and the debate so polarized, that it would be impossible to find a new version of the concept that is acceptable to all parties. Rather, it was argued, 'adjectives should be avoided' alto-

gether. The point was made that the 'robustness' necessary for force protection is already a possibility within the current concept of peacekeeping. The main concern should be to bolster 'robust' political will at the top level, although the very meaning of the word 'robust' in this case is not clear. In any case, a more firm political stance could increase the standing and legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission, making 'robustness' at the tactical level less necessary.

The UN and Africa – Options for Partnership and Support

The 'New Horizon' non-paper envisions two ways that the UN can contribute to strengthening the capacity of the AU and other regional organizations. Firstly, UN support to the AU can help build long-term capability for the future. Secondly, an emphasis on reinforcing interoperability between the UN and the AU can enhance cooperation and ensure effective utilization of limited global peacekeeping resources. The contribution by Kwesi Aning and Horname Noagbesenu discusses some of the challenges of coordination between the AU, the UN and the EU in multidimensional peace support operations in Africa. While these organizations have their comparative strengths and weaknesses, the article identifies some of the gaps in this relationship and suggests areas of improvement. For instance, they argue that whilst the UN's support to the AU has been very useful, it is the EU's financial support to the AU that has sustained its peacekeeping engagements in Somalia and Darfur.

Several panellists were critical of the capacity of the AU and the African Standby Forces (ASF) to date. While the AU is in the process of increasing its capacity for peacekeeping, the general sentiment was that the progress is too slow, and does not match the needs of the continent. On the other hand, some expressed frustration with the way in which the UN and 'international community' have directed the AU to deal with situations they have been unwilling or unable to deal with through other means – including through UN peacekeeping – while at the same time withholding from the AU the resources that it needs to be more effective.

Another issue was the degree to which AU peacekeeping was still considered a purely military affair. The UN can do more to foster an understanding of the function of multidimensional peacekeeping, and to strengthen the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF.

The degree to which the stabilization mandate of the AU's mission in Somalia (AMISOM) could be regarded as a novelty, or as the new emerging norm for AU peace support operations, was discussed. Some feared that the tendency of the UN Security Council to dispatch understaffed and under-resourced AU missions to conflict areas, such as Darfur and Somalia, would in the end pull the UN into areas of operation beyond their capacities. They argued that when AU missions no longer have the funding or resources to remain engaged, the UN would be compelled to take over, and this will result in the UN having to undertake missions beyond its peacekeeping capabilities.

Emphasizing the Peacemaking and Peacebuilding dimensions of Peacekeeping – China's influence on the future of UN peacekeeping

One theme touched upon in almost every session was the potential future impact of China's increasingly important role in UN peace operations. China's contributions of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations have expanded dramatically in recent years. In June 2010, China was the 15th largest contributor to UN missions, providing more troops, police and military observers than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.⁸ While initially sceptical of UN peacekeeping, fearing that it was a tool of Western domination, China's attitude towards peacekeeping has evolved from hesitant participation to more comprehensive contributions. Over the past 20 years, China has participated in 18 UN peacekeeping operations, and dispatched a total of 15,000 peacekeepers. At present, around 2,000 Chinese officers and soldiers are involved in nine of the 15 UN operations. Providing engineers, transport battalions and field hospitals, China contributes critically needed enabling capabilities. As a member of the Security Council and a prominent contributor of police and military peacekeepers, China also has the potential to influence the future direction of UN peacekeeping doctrine. Until now, however, China has been a very cautious contributor. It has not been very assertive in either the Security Council or in its relations with other member states or the UN Secretariat, when it comes to peacekeeping doctrine and related matters.

8. See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/june10_1.pdf, accessed on 30 August 2010.

Lei Zhao's contribution presents China's official motivations for engaging in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, underlining both normative and instrumental motives in a very positive light. While China is already highly involved in peacekeeping, a prerequisite for further Chinese engagement is addressing how to bolster the protection of peacekeeping forces, whilst the transformative objectives of peacebuilding makes this concept more controversial in the Chinese policy context. Zhao's contribution provides important insights into the fundamental differences between the Western and Chinese understanding of the concept. Thus far, China's emphasis has been on peacebuilding through development, poverty reduction and quick-impact projects. For the future, Chinese policy holds that greater attention should be paid to combining direct prevention with broader, long-term preventive efforts geared at development.

Conclusion

The seminar stimulated a rich debate. It was clear that peacekeeping remains at the cutting edge where ideas and practice meet. Peacekeeping is a microcosm of all the issues and tensions that exist within the peace, security and development dimension of the international system. One specific question that materialized out of the discussions was the tension between broadening and deepening the UN peacekeeping agenda. Should the UN Secretariat be at the forefront of developing new operational concepts such as robustness and protection, or should it focus on consolidating and professionalizing the peacekeeping capacity of the UN? Most seminar participants felt that the UN Secretariat should be doing both, but that the balance between the two should be determined by the context. The Secretariat has a responsibility not just to professionalize current practice, but also to look beyond the horizon to prepare for future challenges, and to understand and respond to medium- to long-term trends.

One suggestion was that the UN Secretariat, in its advice to the UN Security Council, should articulate more clearly the capacity and limitations that peacekeeping missions have to foster peace. One discussion explored whether the vision of peacekeeping is broadening or narrowing, in particular with respect to peacebuilding roles. Some questioned whether the current doctrinal basis captures the diversity of response tools and mechanisms. Others asked where the comparative advantages

of different entities and actors lie, and how the international community can maintain flexibility of response while maintaining a coherent approach.

Despite having to navigate a diplomatic tightrope, UN peacekeeping has proven remarkably adaptable. Over the last two decades UN peacekeeping has expanded, contracted and expanded again against all expectations. It has undertaken a challenging range of missions, and it has transformed the way in which missions are planned and managed, both at headquarters in New York and in the field.

This kind of seminar, where those engaged in navigating the reality and those that make a profession of thinking about how peacekeeping can be done differently come together to help shape each others ideas about the possible and probable, forms a critical part of this process of adaptation and transformation.

Managing Consent – The New Variable?

Ian Johnstone

In recent years consent to UN peacekeeping has faced powerful challenges in Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, Chad and the DRC.¹ Host governments have either called for premature withdrawal of the missions or have so obstructed the operations that fulfilling the mandate became close to impossible. While these challenges have been more direct than what the UN is used to, and may portend a new wave of discontent with UN peacekeeping, they are not new. How to gain, hold and build consent is a challenge that goes back at least to the birth of multidimensional operations. The issues to which it gives rise are conceptual as well as operational, including the nature of consent, the nature of peacekeeping and the normative climate in which consent is granted and peacekeeping occurs.

The Nature of Consent

This article begins with some observations about the nature of consent in peacekeeping practice, doctrine and legal theory. I introduce the notion of a ‘relational contract’ as a framework for analysing the contested and complex nature of consent in peace operations. The second part presents five dilemmas associated with managing consent. The final section, ‘strategies’, draws on relational contract theory to offer proposals on how to manage those dilemmas.

Consent in Peacekeeping Practice

In the context of peacekeeping, consent is the principle that distinguishes Chapter VI from Chapter VII operations: peacekeeping from enforcement action. The voluminous academic literature and official debate on the grey

1. Research for this paper was done as part of a larger study that the author is undertaking for the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.

area between the two – the contested ground of peace enforcement – has not fully clarified the blurred lines.² Today, many UN peace operations have Chapter VII mandates to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians; the mandate of the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH) includes Chapter VII powers to support the transitional government in providing a secure and stable environment.³ The entire mandate of UNMIL is under Chapter VII, even though it was conceived as a consent-based multidimensional operation.⁴ The same was true for ONUB.⁵ Conversely, the expanded UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) includes the authority to ‘take all necessary action to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind... and to protect civilians’, yet was placed entirely under Chapter VI for political reasons.⁶ The latest mandate for the UN operation in Chad/CAR (MINURCAT) shifted from Chapter VII to VI in deference to the wishes of the government, yet still includes the authority to protect civilians.⁷

The Chapter VI/VII distinction may not be meaningful in abstract legal terms and it is rarely determinative when it comes to operational strategies, but it does have political significance when debates arise at UNHQ and in the field about what a peace operation can and cannot do. The challenge is often to find the right balance between consent and coercion, a fault line of debate in contemporary peacekeeping. Consider the difficulty of operationalizing consent in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. While formal consent is always granted in some manner, it is typically qualified in one of three ways: it is either unreliable, brought about by external pressure, or

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2. The latest effort is the ‘Capstone Doctrine’: ‘Although the line between ‘robust’ peacekeeping and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host-state authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for member states under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.’, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations, 2008: 19 [hereinafter, the Capstone Doctrine].
 3. Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004).
 4. Security Council Resolution 1509(2003).
 5. Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004).
 6. Security Council Resolution 1701(2006).
 7. Security Council Resolution 1923 (2010).

open-ended. Unreliable consent is common in conflicts involving more than two actors not under the complete control of the main protagonists. Even when a ceasefire or peace agreement is signed, there is no guarantee it will be respected. Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the 1995 Dayton Agreement are early post-Cold War examples. Sierra Leone is a more recent example, where the freedom of movement of some UNAMSIL peacekeepers was so restricted that they were virtual hostages. In the DRC, MONUC was first deployed in 2000 to monitor the Lusaka Agreement, but the cooperation of the eight signatories (six governments and two rebel groups) was always tenuous, and multiple armed groups posed – and still pose – a challenge to the peacekeepers. In Sudan, the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by the government and only one rebel faction, quickly became meaningless as a basis for consent to the UN mission (UNAMID).

Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton, Kosovo and East Timor are cases of consent under pressure. In the first two, consent to the peace operations followed NATO bombing campaigns. In East Timor, Indonesia consented to INTERFET only after ten days of intense diplomatic pressure, threats of economic sanctions and a speech by the Secretary-General warning of international criminal prosecution. Thus in all three places, the consent granted was hardly an act of volition, and indeed verged on duress.

Open-ended consent is illustrated by Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique, where the parties invited the UN to monitor and support implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. No peace agreement, no matter how comprehensive, can provide for every contingency. Gaps in the accords materialize, problems of interpretation arise and circumstances change throughout the life of a peace process. Signing these peace agreements, with obligations that are not well-specified and that will take time to implement is, in effect, a gesture of faith that later problems can be worked out on a consensual basis. The peace agreements remained the foundation of the peace process in all three, but actual implementation deviated from them, especially in Cambodia.

Consent in Peacekeeping Doctrine

The UN *Capstone Doctrine* (2008) is notable for two innovations on the issue of consent. First, it stresses that the consent required is not only to the

presence of a peacekeeping operation, but also to a political process.⁸ More helpful than the truism that peacekeeping is not the right instrument when there is no peace to keep is the notion that peacekeeping can succeed only if accompanied by a viable political process. Gauging the viability of a political process is no easy task. Both parties to the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire wanted a UN peacekeeping mission, but for different and incompatible reasons. The Secretary-General ultimately recommended and the Security Council agreed to the deployment of a mission in the hope that peacekeepers could help cultivate a political process. While large-scale violent conflict has not broken out since the deployment, the 'viability' of the peace process has been in doubt. The UN originally recommended against deploying a mission to Chad because there was no political process for it to support. The SC authorized EUFOR Chad/RCA as a compromise, but with a limited security mandate and on the understanding that the UN would take over in a year. When MINURCAT was deployed with the grudging consent of the government, it had no political mandate and therefore no ability to nurture a political process. The government's demand for its early withdrawal, therefore, was hardly surprising.

A second important Capstone innovation is the distinction between 'tactical' and 'strategic' consent.⁹ The idea is that a UN mission must gain and keep the consent of the main parties to the conflict, but can act robustly against spoilers at the local level without losing its character as peacekeeping. While this marks a step forward in doctrinal thinking, it is not clear how workable the distinction is in the field. Determining whether the source of a particular 'spoiler' is a minor actor operating locally or a proxy for one of the main parties is not easy. In the DRC and Sudan (both Darfur and the South), there are many groups that could fall in one category or the other; whether to take them on militarily or negotiate for their cooperation is a difficult judgment call.

8. Capstone Doctrine, 31.

9. The terminology is used on p. 19 of the Capstone Doctrine and the idea is developed at pp. 31–32. It echoes the British notion of 'wider peacekeeping' introduced in 1993, which drew on recent experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and from observing the USA in Somalia. The doctrine holds that in complex internal conflicts, consent can be lost at the tactical level (i.e. the peacekeepers may be challenged by a local group and can use force against them) but this must not be allowed to bring about a loss of consent at the strategic or operational level (i.e. consent to the overall mission).

Consent in Relational Contract Theory

Consent is a contested concept not only in peacekeeping practice, but also in domestic and international law. This essay does not delve into all the legal dimensions, but relational contract theory is an illuminating way of thinking about peace agreements. Contract theory envisions all contracts as being on a spectrum that ranges from discrete, one-off transactions to long-term relational arrangements. A contract is relational ‘to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations, [either] because of the inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified...’¹⁰ A transactional contract, by contrast, involves a discrete, one-time exchange of goods. To illustrate, in the context of economic relations, a collective bargaining agreement between a union and management is relational; buying a full tank of petrol from a station on a highway far from home is a one-off transaction. In the context of personal relations, a marriage is a relational contract; a one-night stand is a transaction.¹¹ The two are on a spectrum: almost all contracts are ‘relational’ to an extent and even the most relational contracts have ‘transactional’ qualities.¹²

Peace agreements are like relational contracts in various ways. First, the parties want and expect the relationship to endure. They are committed to making it work, even if there are disputes over how. Second, the terms of the relationship are somewhat open-ended. The contract is not simply an exchange of obligations, but a framework for managing an on-going potentially, long-term relationship. Third, the content of the contract and meaning of its provisions develops over the course of the relationship, through interaction. Fourth, relational contracts tend to implicate stake-

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10. Goetz, C. and R. Scott. ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’. *Virginia Law Review* 6 1981:1089–1091. See also Eisenberg, Melvin. ‘Relational Contracts’, in Beatson, Jack and Daniel Friedmann (eds). *Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
 11. Leckey, R. ‘Relational Contracts and Other Models of Marriage’, *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 40, no. 1, 2002.
 12. The leading relational contract theorist is I.R. Macneil. See his *The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980; also his ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’. *Northwestern University Law Review* 94, no. 3, 2000: 877.

holders other than the immediate parties (for example, other companies with whom the party to a collective bargaining agreement has contractual relations). Fifth, relational contracts are ‘living documents’ whose terms must be interpreted and applied in light of changing circumstances. Sixth, consent matters but the nature of the consent must be understood in the context of the overall relationship (including the power dynamics) and not merely what was explicitly assented to at the time of signing.

Managing Consent: Dilemmas and Challenges

Uncertainty About the Core Business of Peacekeeping

Uncertainty about how transformative multidimensional peacekeeping should be creates dilemmas for managing consent. Doctrinal thinking in the UN describes ‘sustainable peace’ as the goal of any peace process, characterized by action in five areas: security; political processes; rule of law and human rights; governance and public administration; and socio-economic development. Precisely how these functions are conceived varies among the missions, but the extent to which they permeate policy documents and mandates is striking.¹³ This ambitious agenda raises questions about whether peace operations are exercises in social engineering based on liberal democratic models, and it raises concerns about the transformative capacity of outside intervention: even if the creation of liberal democratic states is a worthy goal, what can outsiders do to achieve that goal?

It also gives rise to questions about the core business of peacekeeping. What is it that peacekeepers, as opposed to other external actors, can be expected to do during the limited period when they are deployed? The Capstone Doctrine focuses on security, rule of law, political processes and coordination.¹⁴

13. In the UN context, see for example, United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General. *No Exit Without Strategy*, S/2001/384, 20 April 2001; Center on International Cooperation. *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty*. April 2009; Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. July 2009 [hereinafter *New Horizon*]; United Nations, Report of the Secretary General. *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009. For thinking outside the UN context, see United States Institute for Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. 2009.

14. Capstone Doctrine, 23.

The ‘New Horizon’ non-paper specifies that among the priorities established in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding, ‘support to national political processes and the provision of safety and security’ are a peacekeeping operation’s core capacities. This may include ‘the re-establishment of frameworks for governance,’ but leaves out things like the provision of basic services and the socio-economic dimensions of peacebuilding – where peacekeepers are primarily in the role of supporting other external actors.¹⁵

This is already a step back from the most ambitious vision for peacekeeping. There is pressure for further retrenchment, driven by a sense that the transformative goals of peacebuilding are simply too ambitious, as well as financial considerations and lack of political will. The implications for managing consent are profound, and in fact cut both ways. On the one hand, it is easier to sustain genuine consent for minimal goals. Fewer interlocutors need to be engaged and the leverage of outsiders can be targeted. On the other hand, consent to a minimalist intervention may not provide sufficient reassurance to all stakeholders. Consider the perspective of rebel groups. To lay down their arms and join a political process may require more in exchange from the government than a promise to treat the rebels fairly when the peacekeepers leave. They may insist on the transformation of political, legal and administrative institutions, with some sort of external guarantee that the changes will hold.

Peacekeeping as an Obsolescing Bargain

If a peacekeeping mandate is a ‘bargain’ between outside actors and local elites, then in simple (and highly stylized) terms, it looks like this: local elites want security and development assistance, in exchange for which they are willing to tolerate governance reforms, human rights monitoring and other elements of the liberal peace.¹⁶ Since the former is likely to reinforce the power of the elites and the latter undermine it, ongoing negotiation on the implementation of the mandate is likely to be necessary. In this sense, a peace agreement is more like a ‘relational contract’ between three

15. New Horizon, 23.

16. Barnett, M. and C. Zurcher, ‘The peacebuilders’ contract: how external statebuilding reinforces weak statehood’, in Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk (eds), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, Oxon: Routledge, 2009.

or more actors – the parties to the conflict and the external actors – than a one-off bilateral transaction.

If there is any truth to that stylized description of a peacekeeping mandate, it is also true that the bargain is an obsolescing one. As Doyle and Sambanis explain, the authority of the UN is never greater than at the moment of signing a peace treaty because that is when the parties are most dependent on the UN, and the UN has put little of its prestige and resources on the line.¹⁷ David Edelstein adds that the welcome of intervening forces by the host population tends to diminish over time.¹⁸ I would add further that this ‘obsolescing welcome’ is matched by ‘obsolescing will’ in intervening countries, especially when the perceived costs of continued deployment start to outweigh benefits. Afghanistan is a case in point.

Adding a further layer of complexity, the dynamics of the bargain depend on the strength of the government with which one is dealing. Typically, the UN starts out dealing with weak transitional governments, as in Haiti, Burundi and the DRC. The governments need the UN (and other external actors), especially for security and development assistance, and therefore are willing to tolerate significant external interference in exchange. But as the government becomes stronger, it becomes less tolerant of international tutelage – content to accept a small peacebuilding presence if that means greater economic aid, but less interested in a military presence and governance advice. This dynamic played out in Burundi after the 2005 elections and the DRC after the 2006 elections. While understandable, it is ironic that a purpose of peacekeeping is to strengthen sovereign capacity to provide security throughout the state, but the stronger the government gets, the less leverage outsiders have to ensure it does so in a legitimate and sustainable manner. Victory in the 2006 elections made the DRC government feel strong enough to begin exerting its will vis-à-vis opposition forces and outsiders, but still weak enough that it feared those forces and therefore sought to neutralize them through less-than-democratic means.

17. Doyle, M. and N. Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006: 309.

18. Edelstein, D. ‘Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions and Postwar Statebuilding’, in Paris and Sisk (eds). *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 2009: 81, 83.

The dilemma for the UN in these cases is how to use its declining leverage to remain engaged across the multi-dimensional spectrum, without looking and behaving like an unwelcome occupation force.

In Sudan, the UN has been dealing with a relatively strong government from the start. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment, though criticized for its timing and potential impact on the peace process, did provide leverage that led the government to become more cooperative on the deployment of UNAMID, visas, customs and the like. In the 2010 elections, however, President Bashir consolidated his power, which may lead to a return to more repressive rule.¹⁹ It also gave the government new confidence in dealing with UNAMID, illustrated by an announcement at the end of July 2010, shortly after the mission's mandate was extended for a year, that the peacekeepers would have their bags searched at airports, and would have to inform the Sudanese government before moving on roads, even within cities.²⁰

Ownership: Consent of the Parties or Compact with the Population?

There is a premium on local ownership in a peace process, both as a normative stance (people ought to have control over the decisions that affect their lives) and as a requirement for effectiveness (no peace process will succeed if there is not broad buy-in). But what does that mean in practice? Working with those who hold power – typically the parties to the conflict and peace agreement – is the starting point. But conventional wisdom is that local ownership cannot stop there. Factional leaders do not necessarily represent broad constituencies, and the institutions created in deference to their preferences may not be respected by other stakeholders who have the capacity to undermine a peace process. The difficulty of cultivating stable, legitimate governance in Afghanistan is a case in point. Sustainable peace requires inclusive politics. In terms of managing consent, this means engaging with opposition parties, the legislative branch, mid-level government officials, local governors and administrators, civil society and the private sector.

19. *The Economist*, 'Back to the bad old ways: Sudan after the elections', 5 June 2010: 54.

20. BBC. 'Sudan to monitor movements of UN peacekeepers', 31 July 2010, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10829620>

Moreover, the peacekeeping ‘bargain’ is not reached in a vacuum; it occurs within a normative framework embodied in the UN Charter and elaborated through legal instruments and organization practice. These norms and values have evolved since 1945, as have the parameters of consent. What constitutes matters that are ‘essentially within domestic jurisdiction’ (Article 2(7)) has narrowed, and the scope for UN ‘intervention’ has widened. This is true for ‘enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ but also for consent-based peacekeeping. The monitoring and promotion of human rights, for example, is no longer seen as a purely internal matter. This strengthens the UN’s hand in dealing with recalcitrant governments, but also creates operational dilemmas. Consider Sudan, where UNAMID and UNMIS must navigate the difficult terrain of working – and brokering agreements – with a government led by a president against whom an arrest warrant has been issued by the ICC. Similar dilemmas have arisen in the DRC, where the government has shown a reluctance to implement its own ‘zero tolerance’ policy with respect to human rights abuses committed by the DRC armed forces (FARDC) – including the failure to arrest an army commander indicted by the ICC.

Even more problematic when it comes to managing consent are democratic norms. Arguably there is an emerging entitlement to participatory (if not Western-style democratic) governance in international affairs. Does that mean that the UN has a responsibility to resist repressive rule, whether by unelected or elected governments? How hard should it insist on strict implementation of a mandate that refers to the promotion of democracy and the rule of law? Tying this to the notion of ‘relational contracts’, perhaps the peace agreement should be seen not merely as a bargain between the host government and local elites, but as a social compact with the population as a whole.²¹ In the DRC, the government and some of its opponents are finding a way of stabilizing their relations. Does that justify withdrawing MONUC before legitimate, participatory government institutions have been established? The dilemma for the UN here and elsewhere is that the harder it pushes for adherence to basic norms as a matter of principle, the greater the risk of losing the cooperation of those who hold power.

21. In briefing the UN Security Council, Under-Secretary General LeRoy used the word ‘compact’ to describe the relationship between the UN and DRC.

How Close to Your Host?

The consent-based nature of peacekeeping means that the UN must preserve a good relationship with the host government. The UN's poor relations with the government of Sudan have compromised UNMIS' ability to facilitate implementation of the North–South peace agreement. Yet, too close a relationship can also cause problems. MINURCAT's proximity to the government of Chad made it reluctant to resist government obstructionism. MONUC's joint operations with the FARDC, one of the greatest human rights abusers in the country, has undermined the legitimacy of the mission. UNMIS' principal role leading to and after the referendum in early 2011 is to build the capacity of the government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). While justifiable in the context of North–South relations, undemocratic tendencies of the GoSS means the UN could be in the position of propping up two governments (in the North and in the South) as they gradually erode the political freedom and space UNMIS was mandated to help create.

The problem goes even deeper. In a minimalist view of peacekeeping, the 'consent' needed is essentially to allow the peacekeepers to serve as an impartial referee between the two sides. In a maximalist view, it entails consent to a significant external role in the transformation of a society. In Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) has obstructed the ability of the UN to play either role. It has insisted that the parties deal with most issues under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement bilaterally, including matters that must be resolved in the lead-up to and following the referendum, like the border and oil-revenue sharing. Given its inability to engage the parties directly on core political issues, UNMIS' strategy for a time was to press on DDR, SSR, the rule of law and the preparation for elections, hoping that this would create the conditions for progress on core issues. But the NCP was deeply resistant to UN pressure or even assistance on governance and human rights functions, especially when the international focus shifted to Darfur in 2006.

As Darfur, Chad and Eritrea illustrate, the 'bargaining' process can become farcical. The need for consent, if taken too far, can leave the UN in the position of conceding a great deal in order to keep that consent. If it concedes

too much, one wonders what the bargain is about. All the UN may be receiving in exchange for the concessions it makes is the right to be there, without the ability to do anything substantive.

Constructive Withdrawal of Consent: Death by a Thousand Cuts

The Capstone Doctrine refers to the *de facto* withdrawal of consent, when consent given grudgingly is withheld in various ways, such as restrictions on freedom of movement.²² The extreme end of this is hostage-taking of peacekeepers, as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. More common is incremental obstruction of the mission, never quite amounting to a direct challenge to its presence, but debilitating enough to seriously jeopardize its ability to fulfil the mandate. Thus Eritrea, in response to Ethiopia's refusal to accept the decision of the boundary commission, incrementally imposed restrictions on the UN mission (UNMEE) – first by banning helicopter observation, then by restricting land patrols and finally by cutting off all fuel deliveries to troops stationed on its side of the border. Sudan's tactics of insisting on African troops, denying visas and customs delays had a similar impact on the deployment of UNAMID. At what point does this 'death by a thousand cuts' amount to the constructive withdrawal of strategic consent?

The lesson is that giving in to the government on small matters can be a slippery slope. The GoS has tested the UN in multiple ways, no more dramatically than when it declared Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jan Pronk *persona non grata* for posting on his personal blog that the SAF had lost two major battles in Darfur in September 2006. This was preceded by an earlier incident when two UNMIS civilian staff members were declared *personae non gratae* and kicked out of the country after attending a human rights rally in Khartoum. The same may be true of Chad, where a desire not to offend the government meant that MINURCAT was dictated to on a range of issues, from the Status of Forces Agreement to the transfer of EUFOR Chad/CAR sites to the UN peacekeepers.

22. Capstone Doctrine, 32.

Arguably, compromises made on these issues made it harder for the UN to push back on the government's demand for termination of the mission.

Strategies For Managing Consent

Treat Peace Agreements as Multiparty Relational Contracts

Comprehensive peace agreements are living documents that should be interpreted creatively in light of changing circumstances. The lesson is not to ignore the peace agreement as circumstances change, but rather treat it as the foundation for an ongoing process of managing relations between the parties. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was negotiated between Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader John Garang and Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha. When Garang died and the idea of 'making unity attractive' lost its lustre, the CPA did not become irrelevant, but its implementation required a more proactive UN role in pushing for an inclusive political process, as opposed to relying on the charismatic leadership and good relations between the architects of the CPA.

If peace agreements are 'living documents', then devices for ongoing dispute settlement and dialogue should be devised as a way of managing consent. Benchmarks can be used as instruments for engaging the parties in consultations on progress towards implementation of a mandate. Thus the UN (both the Secretariat and Security Council) has been pushing for a benchmark-guided withdrawal from the DRC rather than fixed timelines, and is using benchmarks as the basis for review and assessments with the government over the next 12 months.²³ Integrated strategic frameworks – now a requirement wherever UN missions and UN country teams are present -- can serve a similar purpose. MONUC and the UN Country Team in the DRC drafted an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) in late 2009, with timelines and a division of labour. The Congolese government was not satisfied with the arrangement, so negotiations continue, at the heart of which is the need for a larger peacebuilding 'limb' of the UN presence as an incentive for the government not to force a premature withdrawal of the mission.²⁴

23. Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010), para. 7.

24. Security Council Reports, *Monthly Forecast, DRC*, April 2010.

Finally, the notion of relational contracts suggests an expansive vision of whose consent to a peace process matters. This means an inclusive, deliberative form of political engagement with all stakeholders in the ‘social compact’ that a peace agreement embodies. When and how to cultivate inclusive politics will vary from place to place (indeed, there is a risk of ‘delegitimizing’ a government if a peace operation seems to be going around it by engaging directly with the population), but to assume that the only voices that matter are the signatories to the peace agreement is to overlook a critically important dimension of contemporary peacekeeping.

Build Leverage to Avoid Premature Obsolescence of the Bargain

If the peacekeeping ‘bargain’ tends to obsolesce over time, then devices should be found for building leverage to avoid premature obsolescence. Quick-impact projects and peacebuilding assistance can be useful bargaining chips. The government of Chad agreed to a short extension of MINURCAT to the end of 2010 after the third technical/political assessment mission that visited that year re-affirmed its offer to help with infrastructure projects like roads and airfields.

Giving the UN a seat in transitional institutions is another way of exercising leverage.²⁵ The UN chairs the Implementation Monitoring Committee in Burundi – composed of the parties to the Arusha Agreement, the AU, EU and other external actors – to good effect. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee in Sudan worked well in part because it was chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, who used it proactively to prevent minor skirmishes from escalating into major crises.²⁶ The Ceasefire Political Commission worked less well, mainly because the parties to the CPA elected not to use it and instead decided to address thorny political issues in the NCP-SPLM Joint Political Committee, without international involvement.²⁷

25. I am grateful to Garth Schofield for highlighting the role of the UN in transitional institutions as way of managing consent.

26. Bah, S. and I. Johnstone. ‘Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace’. in Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*. New York: New York University, 2007: 34.

27. United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan*. S/2006/278, 12 September 2006, para. 14.

Groups of ‘friends’, contact groups and Security Council missions can also provide leverage for managing consent, by bringing diplomatic pressure and offering incentives. They serve as mechanisms for ensuring that ‘difficult governments’ do not play multiple mediators and other external actors off against each other. They are also vehicles for engaging systematically with neighbouring countries that have the ability to either support or disrupt a peace process.

Beware the slippery slope

Managing consent sometimes means being ‘more royalist than the king’. Standing on principle can be justified on normative as well as pragmatic grounds. If a peace agreement is a ‘social compact’, then the UN is justified in insisting on compliance even if the parties themselves are disposed to accept less than full implementation. Minor violations or obstructions may seem tolerable in the interest of maintaining a positive relationship with the host government – but this can be a slippery slope, as the cases of Eritrea and Darfur have shown.

Conversely, if progress stalls on some issues, that should not stand in the way of pushing ahead on others, even if they seem peripheral. There are limits of course – incremental state-building is not possible in the complete absence of consent, as the case of Sudan illustrates. But most cases are more dynamic, with progress on minor issues serving to buy time or build confidence for progress on major issues. This can generate the sort of interaction that effective management of ‘relational contracts’ requires.

Finally, keeping some political distance from the host government is important for managing consent. ‘Consent’ as a peacekeeping principle is not the same as the partnership that development agencies establish with governments. Rather it is closely tied to the notion of impartiality, understood as even-handed refereeing among the parties and principled application of the mandate.²⁸ Deferring to the preferences of the host government at any price is not managing consent, but abdicating responsibility for ensuring the mandate is fulfilled in a principled manner. That is not justifiable, in theory or in practice.

28. Capstone Doctrine, See also, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 50.

Expanding and Engaging TCCS and PCCs: Towards a Capability-driven Approach

Donald C. F. Daniel

This section explicates six propositions about national troop contributions to peace operations that are relevant to the UN effort to expand contributors. They are presented didactically and based on previous analyses.¹ The first four identify trends from the last decade. While the past is not prologue, it is safer to assume continuity absent contrary evidence. Doing so keeps expectations in check.

Troop Contributing Countries

1. **Even though there are 192 UN member states and 14 million soldiers in active service, the number of significant contributors will rarely exceed 35 and the maximum number of troops 150,000 (excluding US troops in ISAF) at any one time.**

Three reasons undergird this proposition. One is that most countries are small contributors. About 120 or so provided troops (including military observers) to peace operations in 2009, but only 34 provided 1000 or more. A consistent trend of the last decade is that one-fourth to one-third of contributors provided two-thirds to three-quarters of all troops. A second reason is that even contributors with large ground forces gen-

1. See Daniel, D.C.F. and L. Caraher. 'Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations and Implications for Global Capacity'. *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 3 2006: 297–315; Daniel, D. C. F., K. Heuel and B. Margo. 'Distinguishing Among Military Contributors', in Daniel, D.C.F., P. Taft, and S. Wiharta (eds), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008: 27–46; Daniel, D. C. F. 'Why So Few Troops From Among So Many'. *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, 47–62; Daniel, D. C. F. 'Partnering for Troop Supply', submitted; and Daniel, D. C. F. 'Trans-regional Military Dimensions of Civilian Protection: A Two-Part Problem with a Two-Part Solution' (forthcoming).

erally deploy only a small percentage of their troops to peace operations. In the last decade, the median for unit contributors was 3.6 percent and the mean 5.3. For every unit deployed, however, most militaries need an additional three or four earmarked to sustain the commitment; thus the deployment of 3.6 to 5.3 percent of a country's soldiers could tie up from 14 to 21 percent of all its ground forces. A third reason is a levelling off in deployed troop numbers to a high of 165,000. Much of the recent growth is attributable to the United States increasing its average presence in ISAF from 11,000 in 2006 to 29,000 in 2009 (climbing to 78,000 today). Hence, an estimated maximum of 150,000 is reasonable since the 2008 total of 145,000 (minus the USA in ISAF) was at the apogee, dropping to 130,000 in 2009.

2. Nominal and non-contributors are not especially promising sources of significant numbers of well-resourced troops for UN operations.

There were 98 unit contributors from 2001 through 2008. From a review of the size of their ground forces and the overall capability of their militaries (as measured by spending per personnel), it is clear that a nation with fewer than 4000 soldiers or that spends less than USD 3000 per personnel has a very small probability to contribute. Applying these criteria to the 52 nominal and non-contributors of the last decade leaves us with 34 countries to consider (see Table 1). If one accepts that countries with small militaries have a low probability of being significant contributors, that means that 13 of them can be eliminated. In addition, yet another 13 have low overall military capability as measured by personnel spending. Because the UN's need for well-resourced units may be even greater than its need for more quantity, these 13 do not constitute strong candidates. This leaves eight states that have at least medium-sized forces of medium capability or better – but two are Israel and Taiwan, countries that would draw considerable objections, and four others are from the Mideast/ North Africa, a region noted for the unwillingness of most states to contribute to peacekeeping. Thus, of the eight, only Angola, Kazakhstan, and Venezuela are left, with the last possibly drawing objections from the United States. In short, the prospects here are limited.

3. Two groups among existing contributors are more promising.

The first encompasses states whose moving averages have shown recent healthy increases: the USA, China, Bangladesh, Egypt, Rwanda, and Burundi. Whether they will continue to increase remains to be seen, but the USA can be discounted as a UN contributor. A second group consists of states that have evidenced a willingness to be important contributors in the recent past and, if approached, might be induced to return to levels they had earlier achieved. The most interesting in this regard are the members of a cross-cutting cluster of states identified under proposition (5).

4. From a global perspective, troop-unit contributors fall into three groups: a UN cluster (UNC), a cross-cutting 'Western' agendas cluster (CCAC), and a third 'mixed bag.'

The UN cluster is a cohesive group of 34 countries, nearly all of whom since 2001 have contributed only through the UN (Table 2 lists this and the other groups.) The organization itself seemed to be the magnet drawing them together. A second cluster consisted of 31 countries whose individual choices in this decade as to where to go and under what auspices seem to complement one another with the collective result cutting across organizations and regions. This cross-cutting 'Western' agendas cluster (CCAC) involved deployments of troops to NATO, EU, and *ad hoc* coalition missions mainly in Europe, the Mideast, and South Asia. Finally, there is a 'mixed bag' of 33, mostly modest, contributors. Because the term 'cluster' implies centripetal pull among the entities in the cluster, it is best not to apply it to this third group. They are not birds of a feather, but vary widely as to their provenance, operational experience, and the size and quality of their militaries.

5. If projections about Western forces drawing down from Afghanistan in 2011 come to pass, then the CCAC countries minus the United States would seem a highly attractive group to approach in light of their overall military capabilities and previous peace operations experience.

Each has at least medium capability and a medium-sized ground force with high operational experience, except for Georgia, Japan, Norway, Thailand, and South Korea. Further, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey are either been past members of the ‘UN Fire Brigade’ or have exhibited a willingness to participate in at least one UN mission since 2001.

6. Whether or not the UN attracts highly capable CCA states, it should partner nations together to fill a critical capability gap: the formation of Standing High Readiness mission-planning and headquarters Battalions (SHIRBATs) to serve as the initial elements of missions involving several thousand people.

Modelled on the now defunct and more ambitious Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a SHIRBAT would draw its personnel from individual nations. Prior to any contingency, contributors would familiarize themselves with one another and with each other’s militaries, with UN procedures, and with common UN-provided communications and information-management equipment. They would hash out procedures, exercise and train together, and be part of UN evaluation teams sent out in anticipation of a mission. With a specific mission in mind and in coordination with the Military Advisor and the other deploying nations, they would formulate rules of engagement. Beyond being part of the headquarters, each SHIRBAT member would deploy at least a battalion as part of the first tactical or support troops on the ground. A SHIRBAT would deploy long enough to give the UN time to assemble a follow-on headquarters team.

Table 3 lists countries (names and scores are highlighted in grey color) which should probably be approached by the Secretary-General and Military Advisor to join the initial SHIRBAT. Several criteria drove the choices. One is that the effort should focus on the 10 to 15 states necessary to provide it sufficient critical mass to deploy one SHIRBAT since some of the states generically willing to join a SHIRBAT may demur from deploying to a specific operation. Other criteria were applied to specific states.

- Look for regional representation.
- Favour Francophone countries because the UN has requested this characteristic.
- Restrict the list to countries whose 2001–08 contributions were above the median for all contributors.
- Favour states that provided UN force commanders since 2001.
- Exclude CCAC countries because many UN contributors see them as having too much clout
- Seek out countries whose culture (e.g., Islamic) or language beyond French (e.g., Spanish or Portuguese) could prove significant.

On the basis of these decision rules, 18 states seem initially attractive partners. From South Asia are Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; from Africa are Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa; from North Africa and the Mideast are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia; from South America are Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay; from Europe/Eurasia are Austria and Ukraine and from East Asia and the Pacific are China and Indonesia.

Conclusion

In sum, the ‘New Horizon’ project calls for engaging and expanding new contributors, but if the analysis above is on target, there is little prospect for expansion or, for that matter, for increasing troop numbers. The UN should concentrate on two goals: increasing the availability of countries with medium to high overall military capabilities and the availability of quick-response lead elements. Consistent with the first goal it should in particular approach CCAC states as they draw down from Afghanistan (presumably in 2011). Consistent with the second goal, it should make the effort to form Standing High Readiness Battalions. This analysis has attempted to suggest states that the UN should engage as it pursues each goal.

Table 1. Ground Force Size (GFS) and Overall Military Capability (OMC) of Nominal and Non-Contributors

	High OMC	Medium OMC	Low OMC
Large GFS	None	Algeria Angola Israel Taiwan	Iran Mexico Myanmar Syria Vietnam
Medium GFS	Oman Saudi Arabia	Kazakhstan Venezuela	Armenia Belarus Cuba Ecuador Lebanon Libya Yemen Zimbabwe
Small GFS	Bahrain Kuwait	Brunei Cyprus Serbia	Bosnia-Herzegovina Botswana Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Kyrgyzstan Madagascar Paraguay Tajikistan

Table 2 Three 'global' groups

34 UN	31 CCWA	33 Other
Argentina*	Albania	Burundi
Bangladesh*	Australia	Rwanda
Benin	Belgium	Sudan
Bolivia*	Bulgaria	Tanzania
Brazil	Canada	Uganda
Cambodia*	Czech	Chad
Chile	Denmark	Congo
China, PR*	Finland	Moldova
Egypt*	Georgia	Russia
Ethiopia	Germany	Azerbaijan
Ghana	Greece	Croatia
Guatemala*	Hungary	Dom Rep
Guinea-Bis.	Italy	El Salvador
Guinea	Japan	Estonia
India*	Lithuania	Honduras
Indonesia*	Malaysia	Latvia
Jordan*	Netherlands	Macedonia
Kenya	New Zealand	Nicaragua
Malawi	Norway	Fiji
Namibia	Poland	Gabon
Nepal*	Portugal	Gambia, The
Niger	Romania	Mali
Nigeria	Singapore	Mozambique
Pakistan*	Slovenia	South Africa
Peru*	South Korea	Colombia
Philippines*	Spain	Switzerland
Senegal	Sweden	UAE
Slovakia	Thailand	Austria
Sri Lanka*	Turkey	France
Togo	United Kingdom	Ireland
Tunisia*	United States	Mongolia
Uruguay*		Morocco
Zambia		Ukraine
Qatar **		

* indicates a UN 'Global' state ** Qatar is a special case

Table 3. Potential SHIRBAT Contributors

Country	GFS	OMC	OE	HDI	UN Contribution	Total Score	Francophone	Force Commander Exp
India	3	2	3	2	3	13		Yes
Bangladesh	3	1	3	2	3	12		Yes
Pakistan	3	1	3	2	3	12		Yes
South Africa	2	2	3	2	3	12		Yes
Morocco	3	1	3	2	3	12	Yes	
China, PR	3	2	2	2	3	12		Yes
Austria	2	3	2	3	2	12		Yes
Nepal	2	1	3	2	3	11		Yes
Uruguay	1	1	3	3	3	11		Yes
Jordan	2	1	3	2	3	11		Yes
Brazil	3	2	2	2	2	11		Yes
Argentina	2	2	2	3	2	11		
Nigeria	2	1	3	1	3	10		Yes
Ghana	1	1	3	2	3	10		Yes
Ethiopia	3	1	2	1	3	10		
Ukraine	3	1	2	2	2	10		
Sri Lanka	3	1	2	2	2	10		
Kenya	1	2	2	1	3	9		Yes
Egypt	3	1	1	2	2	9	Yes	
Tunisia	2	1	2	2	2	9	Yes	
Indonesia	3	1	1	2	2	9		
Senegal	1	1	2	1	3	8	Yes	Yes
Rwanda	2	1	2	1	2	8	Yes	Yes
Namibia	1	2	1	2	2	8		
Benin	1	1	2	1	2	7	Yes	Yes
Zambia	1	1	2	1	2	7		

Civilian Capacities in UN Peace Operations

Cedric de Coning

One of the most significant, but often overlooked, developments in the UN is the transformation from military- to civilian-focused peace missions.¹ This change has come about as the mandates shifted from monitoring military ceasefires to supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. As these missions became more oriented towards peacebuilding, the role of civilians became more central, the number of civilian functions increased, and the role of civilians shifted from a peripheral support role to the core of contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Civilians now represent approximately 20% of all UN peacekeepers and peacebuilders. As of 28 February 2010, the UN had almost 22,000 civilians deployed, including approximately 8,200 international staff, of which 2,400 were UN volunteers.²

The UN now deploys more civilian peacekeepers than all the other multilateral institutions combined. At the beginning of 2010, the EU had deployed approximately 2,000 civilian personnel; the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approximately 3,000, and the AU was deploying approximately 50 civilians in its current operation in Somalia.

There is a misperception that the global South is under-represented in civilian posts within UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. In fact, of the top 20 nations from which civilian expertise is recruited (con-

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1. The author wishes to acknowledge the editorial support of Walter Lotze and Andreas Øien Stensland from NUPI, as well as very useful comments and suggestions from the UN Civilian Capacity Review team in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office.
 2. All peacekeeping related statistics in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, are based on the UNDPKO-DPI. *United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet*, March 2010, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsheet.pdf> (accessed on 16 June 2010), or on correspondence with DPKO and PBSO in June 2010.

tributing 49.8% of civilian expertise to UN missions), 31.1% are from the South.³ For example, 40% of civil affairs officers in UN missions are drawn from Africa, as against 14% from the Americas (excluding the USA), 10% from Asia and 3% from Oceania. A total of 67% of civil affairs officers in UN missions come from the global South. Approximately 20% of all civil affairs officers are UN volunteers.

In comparison to UN peace operations, the number of civilians in African peace operations has, to date, been rather limited. There were approximately 50 civilian staff in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), compared to the 1,134 international civilian staff, 419 UN Volunteers and 2,557 national civilian staff in the current African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had approximately 33 international staff and 15 national staff as of November 2009.

However, we find a relatively high percentage of Africans in UN peace operations. There were 9 African countries among the top 20 contributors of international civilian staff to UN missions in 2009: 2nd Kenya (4.8%), 7th Ghana (2.9%), 8th Sierra Leone (2.7%), 10th Ethiopia (2.3%), 11th Nigeria (2.2%), 14th Uganda (1.7%), 15th Cameroon (1.6%), 17th Tanzania (1.5%) and 18th Cote d'Ivoire (1.3%). In addition to the international staff, in 2009 the UN employed 15,442 national professional and general service staff in UN missions, and of these 10,109, or approximately 75%, were Africans.⁴

Recruitment and Deployment Challenges

The UN finds it difficult to identify candidates in certain specialized categories, including security sector reform and judicial and prison management. This is partly a function of the availability of these skills in the marketplace in general. To deal with this problem the DPKO has proposed the enhancement of the existing Standing Police Capacity to include justice and corrections specialists.

3. See *2010 Annual Review of Peace Operations*. New York: Center for International Cooperation, 2010.

4. *Ibid.*

In general, however, UN experience shows that a basic assumption in the civilian capacity debate – namely, that there is a worldwide shortage of civilian expertise – is flawed. The UN receives more than 150,000 applications per year for its civilian peacekeeping field positions.⁵ This means that the UN receives approximately 1,500 applications for every civilian position advertised, of which approximately 50 are qualified for consideration for the position.⁶

Despite the large number of people eager to serve in UN missions, the UN suffers from high vacancy rates in its missions. The average vacancy rate of international civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has been around 22%.⁷ In some missions the figures are much higher, especially during the start-up phase. UNAMID had a vacancy rate of 56% in 2008, UNMIS had a vacancy rate of 40% in 2005, and the UN Mission in Afghanistan had a vacancy rate of 42% at the beginning of 2010.⁸

That it takes approximate 200 days for the UN recruitment system to fill a vacancy indicates that the system is too slow and bureaucratic, and clearly not designed for the rapid deployment needs of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions context.⁹ Despite the large number of applicants, there are also persistent complaints from within the system about the quality and appropriateness of those who are short-listed for selection.

A main challenge facing the UN is processing the large number of applications it receives, selecting the most suitable candidates, and the time it takes to process an application from the moment a vacancy is announced until a person is deployed to take up the post.

5. Gourlay, C. *Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations, a DPKO Lessons Learned Study*. New York: United Nations, 2006: 6.

6. Durch, W.J., *Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-Conflict Response*, article prepared for the Center on International Cooperation and the Government of Denmark's Meeting on Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, Copenhagen, 8–9 June 2004: 9.

7. Solli, A., B. de Carvalho, C. de Coning, and M.F. Pedersen. *Bottlenecks to Deployment: The Challenges of Deploying Civilian Personnel to Peace Operations*, Security in Practice 3, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2009: 10.

8. *UNAMA Fact Box*, Kabul: United Nations, 2010.

9. See Low-Level Panel. *Practical Steps to a More Effective and Efficient United Nations*, New York: United Nations, 2004: 5, www.lowlevelpanel.org.

Several recent reports and studies have focused on these problems, highlighting the need to further strengthen the civilian contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.¹⁰ However, the UN's recruitment approach seems to have overcome many of the dilemmas experienced by the EU and others. Because the UN does not rely on secondments, it has no problems attracting staff from the smaller and less developed countries. As mentioned, 60% of the top 20 civilian contributing countries are from the global South.¹¹ The same phenomenon seems to apply to gender. The UN has a higher proportion of women in peace operations than most of its member states have in their civil service. Currently, approximately 30% of the civilians in UN peace operations are female, but there are still disappointingly few women in senior positions.¹²

Training and Rostering Challenges

The training of civilians should occur before recruitment, in preparation for deployment, on joining a mission (induction training), and following deployment (in-mission). Some training institutions, like the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), are increasingly focusing on in-mission training aimed at sharpening skills needed in particular contexts or to address new needs not previously addressed.¹³ All new civilian UN staff now also undergo generic induction training at the UN training centre in Brindisi before deployment. Most missions offer an induction course for all new staff upon entering a new mission. This will typically be conducted by the mission's training cell, but there have been cases where these courses have also been conducted by civilian training

10. In addition to those already mentioned, see also: Chandran, R., J. Sherman, B. Jones, B. S. Forman, A. Le More & A. Hart. *Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps and Options*, New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2009; UN Secretary General. *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, New York: United Nations, 2009, and UNDPKO-DFS. *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, New York: United Nations, 2009.

11. Statistics obtained from Civil Affairs in UN DPKO, May 2010.

12. *DPKO Fact Sheet*, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsheet.pdf> (accessed on 16 June 2010).

13. ACCORD (www.accord.org.za) has conducted Conflict Management for Peacekeepers and Peacebuilders Courses in AMISOM, MINURCAT, MONUC, ONUCI, UNAMID, UNMIL and UNMIS since 2008, and Civil-Military Coordination Courses in AMIS, AMISOM, MONUC and UNMIS since 2006.

centres, as has been done by ACCORD for AMISOM and by Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna for OSCE missions.

The civilian training centres coordinate their work with each other through international and regional associations, and there is a good degree of cooperation and coordination underway among the civilian training community.¹⁴ However, the same cannot be said for the relationship between training and UN recruitment. The linkages between training institutions, rosters and the UN recruitment system are both under-developed and under-explored.

Standby rosters are often seen as an obvious solution to the civilian capacity gap. The idea is that individuals are pre-trained, pre-identified and placed on a standby roster, and that they are then ready to be deployed when the need arises. Reality has, however, proven more complex. There are several different types of rosters. A *standing* capacity has staff who are employed on a full-time basis, with the express purpose of being available as a surge capacity when the need arises. A *standby* capacity consists of persons pre-identified to be deployed when the need arises, usually within a specified time-frame. Finally, a *rostered* capacity operates as a database of potential candidates who can be approached and their suitability assessed as the need arises.¹⁵ There exist several such rosters, most of them either national rosters or civil society based.¹⁶

In the UN civilian capacity context there is a tension between calls for the development of more civilian rosters on the one hand, whilst on the other, the General Assembly resolutions that have restricted the use of gratis per-

14. Coordination occurs through the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (www.iaptc.org) and, for instance in Africa, through the African Peace Support Trainer's Association (www.apsta.org).

15. For example, CANADEM, a national NGO roster of Canadians, has around 15,000 persons in its database, and RedR, an international NGO roster specializing in engineering in emergencies, has approximately 20,000 candidates. See Catriona, 2006: 14.

16. Australia's new Deployable Civilian Capacity, the United Kingdom's Stabilization Unit roster, and the German Peace Operation Centre (ZIF) would be examples of national rosters, whilst examples of civil-society rosters include the Norwegian Refugee Council's NORCAPS, CANADEM, and the African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Missions (AFDEM).

sonnel in UN missions seem to have resulted in a general policy in the UN Secretariat to not work with rosters.¹⁷ The concerns behind these policies are understandable and need to be addressed, but cooperating with rosters need not have a negative impact on the UN's recruitment policies. Most UN agencies do cooperate with rosters, without negative consequences. Rosters provide a complementary pool of potential candidates that the UN can consider, especially for those categories of personnel difficult to hire on the open market, but the choice and management of personnel remains with the UN. The purpose of investing in a roster – shortening the time it will take to fill an urgently needed post – is not understood within the current relationship between the UN and rosters.

Conclusion and Recommendations

A main challenge facing the UN is processing the large number of applications it receives, selecting the most suitable candidates, and finally, the time needed to process an application from when a vacancy is announced until a person is deployed to take up the post.

The UN Secretary-General's 2009 report on peacebuilding provides a solid basis for engagement between the UN and the international peace operations training and rostering community. The UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) has initiated a UN system-wide review of civilian capacity, expected to be completed by the first quarter of 2011.

The review should provide a solid basis for engagement between the UN and the international peace operations training and rostering community. The civilian capacity challenge in UN peacekeeping operations needs focused and sustained attention. The current level of focus on this challenge by both DPKO/DFS and the General Assembly has not managed to improve the situation. What is needed is a much higher level of concentrated political and technical attention to this challenge.

It is thus proposed that a global civilian capacity partnership be established – one that can bring together the international training and ros-

17. General Assembly Resolutions 51/243, 15 September 1997, and 52/234, 26 June 1998.

tering community, the relevant UN agencies and the Secretariat, and interested UN member states, with the aim of meaningfully increasing the intensity and focus of the international community on the civilian capacity challenge in UN peacekeeping operations. The objective of the partnership should be to significantly improve the UN Secretariat's ability to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel within a reasonable time-frame, and without adverse side-effects on the local community or mission mandate.

Furthermore, the following steps should be taken by the UN Secretariat, the member states and the training and rostering community to deal with the civilian capacity challenges faced by the United Nations:

Steps that can be taken by the United Nations

The primary focus of the UN Secretariat should be on improving the UN recruitment system, with the aim of reducing the time it takes to hire new staff, and bettering internal standing capacities and rosters. It also needs to improve the quality of the personnel delivered to the field. The focus should thus be on addressing these shortcomings, rather than on developing new rosters and rapid-deployment systems that require considerable time and resources, and have a poor track record of success.

The current UN initiatives (Civilian Capacity Review and Recruitment System Reform) could benefit from increased and sustained member-state attention and support. Civilian capacity needs to be transformed, from being an internal technical issue to a strategic partnership issue. Clear benchmarks need to be identified, and the UN Secretariat needs to be given the resources necessary to achieve those benchmarks. Interested member states could create a 'Friends-of-Civilian Capacity' entity that can ensure there is sustained and focused attention on this issue and that the Secretariat is supported in a systematic and coordinated manner.

The UN Secretariat needs to be encouraged to enter into meaningful relationships with the training and rostering institutions, because they represent existing capacities that can be made available to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

Steps that can be taken by member states

The concerns of the global South need to be addressed. Initiatives in the North could be paired with initiatives in the South with the aim of ensuring a fair and equitable supply. UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions could benefit from more civilian personnel from the South with cultural, linguistic and applied skill-sets that are appropriately matched with the societies hosting such missions.

Steps that can be taken by the Training and Rostering Community

There exist several institutions that specialize in civilian peacekeeping training and that are organized within the context of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). And there are several international rosters that have been successfully providing civilian personnel to UN agencies and NGOs. These organizations are willing to support the UN to strengthen the linkages between training, rostering and recruitment. The training and rostering communities could establish closer working relations with each other, and with the UN Secretariat, with a view to exploring how they could cooperate to strengthen the UN's civilian capacity.

For training institutions, there is a good global spread. Most civilian training centres and most rosters, however, seem to be clustered in the North. More can be done to encourage the development of civilian training and rostering in the global South.

Accountability and Credibility: Assessing Host Population Perceptions and Expectations

Michael Pugh

‘La liberté, c’est la possibilité d’être et non l’obligation d’être’

René Magritte

Critical analysis of the impact of peace operations on local populations has not been in short supply since François Debrix published his critique in 1997.¹ But students of peace operations had to wait until 2004 – when Béatrice Pouligny published *Ils nous avaient promis la paix* – for the first in-depth fieldwork to provide a substantial and wide-ranging study of the perceptions of peace missions among local populations.² This was followed in 2009 by another sociological critique, Paul Higate’s and Marsha Henry’s *Insecure Spaces*, which focused on Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo. This contends that because international interventions are framed by the exercise of power, interventionists shape perceptions to create inconsistent effects, a mix of secure and insecure spaces.³

At the level of what might be called ‘in-house’ field surveys, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has conducted ‘early warning’ and public opinion surveys for many years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

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1. Debrix, F. *(Re-)envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press Borderlines Series, 1997.
 2. Subsequently published in English as: *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People*. London: Hurst, 2006. The French have been pioneers in other spheres. See for example, the first study of the political economies of post-Cold War conflicts: Jean, F. and J.-C. Rufin (eds.). *L’économie des Guerres Civiles*, Paris: Hachette, 1996.
 3. Higate, P. and M. Henry, *Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*, London: Zed Book, 2009.

has sponsored one among youth in Kosovo in 2009–10. Jean Krasno led a team for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Liberia in 2006 which found overwhelming majorities in support of the view that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had improved the security situation there and that the behaviour of peacekeepers had been good or very good.⁴ Opinion surveys supported by the governments of the United Kingdom and of Norway have also been conducted by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in south Lebanon since 2007. The central purpose was not to involve the population in making decisions about the ‘good life’ but ‘to increase the UNIFIL’s capacity to target its community messaging and communication activities, partly in order to enhance good relations with the communities’.⁵ In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission has been mandated to consult civil society in countries it has focused upon, and the World Bank has funded ‘consultancies’ with local populations in advising on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, or PRSPs.⁶ Nevertheless, consolidated critical debate appears to have been lacking, and the issue of local impact and perceptions seems not to have gathered pace in practitioner forums until about the mid-2000s. A change may be afoot – perhaps reflecting the crisis that the liberal peace has entered, not least because of the inability to accord locals with agency.⁷

Indeed, the lacuna may testify to echoes of imperialism in peace missions. From interviews with ‘peace mission’ personnel that claim to ‘speak for the subaltern’, academics investigating the approach of a range of institutions, including the UN, NATO, the EU and the Arab League, contend that this disguises arrogance and censorship and an amazing lack of concern. A

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4. Krasno, J. ‘External Study: Public Opinion Survey of UNMIL’s Work in Liberia, conducted in January 2006’, DPKO, March 2006, [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/EGUA-6QSM9-dpko-lbr-31mar.pdf/\\$File/dpko-lbr-31mar.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/EGUA-6QSM9-dpko-lbr-31mar.pdf/$File/dpko-lbr-31mar.pdf)). However, survey questions were skewed to provide positive answers: Higate and Henry, *Insecure Spaces*, 2.
 5. DPKO, UNIFIL report.
 6. However, as Pablo Leal contends, ‘the mantra of participation served not to facilitate the agency of the poor and reduce their subjugation by the state and its international backers, but to create ‘a populist justification for the removal of the state from the economy and its substitution by the market’. Leal, P. A. ‘Participation: the ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era’, *Development in Practice* 17, No. 4–5, 2007: 539–48, at 541.
 7. See Cooper, N. ‘On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace’, *Conflict, Security & Development* 7, no. 4, 2007: 605–16; Cooper, Neil, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh ‘The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris’. *Review of International Studies*, forthcoming.

scandalous example of censorship was the UNDP-commissioned Arab Human Development Report of 2009, which leading Middle East academic contributors boycotted or withdrew from after a UNDP Advisory Board had doctored the report to downplay the instabilities arising from the foreign occupation of Iraq and Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories.⁸ If academics could be treated in this way, it suggests a serious flaw in taking wider local views into account, even though a crisis prevention and recovery report, also UNDP-sponsored, had already emphasized the importance of local agency.⁹

Processes and policies in international administrations can reach the status of organized hypocrisy. In an extraordinarily frank admission when comparing his time as a UK MP during Prime Minister Thatcher's tenure in power with his time as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown revealed:

Ironically, as a politician I campaigned against many of her reforms, arguing that they would lead to lost jobs and the selling off of the national wealth; only to find myself instituting very similar reforms in Bosnia and facing the same arguments and opposition. What makes matters worse in most post-conflict countries is that they are poor, not rich – so the pain can be far greater. There is not much the interveners can do about this, except understand it and recognise that by insisting on accelerated reforms we are often asking local politicians to take responsibility for a level of social disruption which our own politicians at home would reject without a second thought.¹⁰

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8. The Dutch referred to this as 'controversial editing' – a bit like calling a beheading a facelift. Turner, Mandy. 'Creating 'partners for peace': the Palestinian Authority and the International Statebuilding Agenda', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, forthcoming 2010; Kawzally, S. 'The Politics of the UNDP Arab Human Development Report', *Monthly Review*, 10 August 2009, <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/kawzally100809.html> ; Richmond, O. 'The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding', *International Spectator* 44, no.1, 2009: 149–69.
 9. UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, *Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity*, New York: United Nations, 2008.
 10. Ashdown, P. *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2007.

This article is now divided into two further parts: on some of the variables affecting legitimacy and host perceptions; and an estimation of what local communities often appear to want.

Relevant Variables

First, the nature of the war and of ‘peace’ to be kept (or whether it exists only in part) has a bearing on legitimacy. An occupation or ‘victor’s peace’ is, by definition, coercive, top–down and liable to engender political resistance. Relief operations seem to enjoy greater acceptability than longer-term statebuilding efforts. Despite anger at distributional inequities in relief operations, the main basis for hostility is the insufficiency of provision, not objections to the relief operation as such. Other forms of peace (‘conservative’, ‘orthodox’ and ‘emancipatory’, in Oliver Richmond’s typology), have different impacts.¹¹ In a victor’s or conservative peace capitalizing on ‘robust’ peacekeeping or warrior attributes, the tendency has been for military, civilian and even NGOs to reside in colonial encampments insulated from the population. The ‘Green Zone’ in Baghdad is perhaps an extreme non-UN example, but the pressure on UN agencies to conform to insurance conditions and certification requirements has a considerable influence on the level of involvement with host societies.¹² So too, will the degree of local dependence on externals, with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) a clear example of the control exercised by donors, as well as Israel, on the ‘peacebuilding’ process since the Oslo Accords. The process served to hobble PNA control of economic policy, marginalizing and excluding sections of Palestinian society.¹³

Second, encounters with local civilians may give rise to high local expectations (examined further below). The foreign military forces have weapons and money. Not unreasonably, the local population will expect these forces to be able to offer both security/protection and financial assistance. In many cases they can offer neither. That is bound to cause frustration

11. Richmond, O. *The Transformation of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2005.

12. Duffield, M. ‘The Fortified Aid Compound: Risk Management, Security Training and Urban Pathology’. University of Bristol, unpublished paper: http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:iyiStSyImU0J:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=2000

13. Turner, ‘Creating ‘partners for peace’’.

among the local population.¹⁴ It can also cause the foreigners to view the locals as ungrateful.¹⁵ Expectations may outstretch the ability of external actors to fulfil them. What constitutes security is open to wide interpretation. This seems to apply, in particular, to supposedly ‘reformed’ post-conflict police forces, which locals often have considerable difficulty in trusting.¹⁶ Locally-supported vigilantes may well have greater legitimacy than the forces of a reconstructed state that is either virtually meaningless (as in Serb areas of Kosovo and in Pacific territories), or regarded as the source of abuse. Whereas a ‘reformed police’ in, say, Bosnia and Herzegovina or El Salvador might be seen by internationals as a solution to security threats, local communities may take a completely contrary view of what those security forces represent. Furthermore, local political elites commonly re-code threats for their own purposes – as ARENA did in El Salvador, where politically-motivated violence, and violence correlated with an economic agenda, was re-coded as ordinary crime to underpin a discourse that the country was being ‘normalized’.¹⁷

Third, the asymmetries of power between peace missions and locals provoke tension. The *arrivistes* have the wealth, the vehicles, computers and access to the outside world. ‘War tourism’ and exploitation can accompany an international presence and even, it has been suggested, pave the way for a sex tourism industry.¹⁸ Of course these may be labelled ‘unintended consequences’, but hegemonic masculinities also have the effect of promoting exploitative engagements.¹⁹ In extreme cases, lack of respect has led to alienation, as with Canadians and Italians in Somalia.²⁰ In addition, foreigners have a secret

14. Haarland, T.L. ‘Still Homeland Defenders at Heart? Military Culture in International Deployments’, *International Peacekeeping* 17, no.4 (forthcoming, 2010).

15. Ibid., citing Bård Mæland. *Skadeskutt idealisme. Norsk offisersmoral i Kosovo [Idealism shot down. Morale among Norwegian officers in Kosovo]*. Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004.

16. See, Moodie, E. *El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty and the Transition to Democracy*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.

17. Ibid.

18. Jennings, K. ‘Unintended Consequences of Intimacy: Political Economies of Peacekeeping and Sex Tourism’, *International Peacekeeping* 17, no.2, 2010: 229–43.

19. 30–40% of Norwegian soldiers revealed that they had bought sex on peacekeeping deployments in the 1980s, though these figures should be treated with caution and appear to be falling. See Haarland, 2010.

20. Sion, L. ‘Dutch Peacekeepers and Host Environments in the Balkans: An Ethnological Perspective’, *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 2, 2008: 201–13.

weapon: immunity.²¹ Of course there are codes of conduct and cultural sensitivity training of peace mission personnel, and measures to deal with wrongdoing. But these safeguards and systems are not evident to locals, who simply see misbehaviour unpunished. The UN has limited power in this regard, such as sending a unit home. In peacebuilding administrations, accountability to local legal processes can sometimes be evaded by appeals to immunity, as the EU's Joly Dixon did with regard to a tax distribution dispute between the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska. Apparently, the EU Commission's Privatization Agency in Kosovo destroyed records before handing over to the local government. Furthermore, in multinational/international missions the complexity of legal responsibility for malpractice can seem to work against local communities, because of the costs of counsel and problems of travelling to trials.

Fourth, there are significant variables affecting perceptions that arise from the particular composition and behaviour of security forces, and of civilians engaged in peacebuilding and NGOs. There is now a growing sociology and ethnography of military components in peace missions. It has been argued that, for example, because soldiers come into daily contact with the host population, the degree of investment in 'warrior culture' and cultural attitudes to 'the Other' are crucially important factors in determining local legitimacy.²² It can make sense to have a predominance of language and religious affinity with the local population, as evidenced by Latin American leadership of missions in Nicaragua and Haiti, and Muslim peacekeepers in Bosniak areas of Bosnia, for example, though there is no guarantee that this will ensure legitimacy. An increase in female peacekeepers in the past ten years is said to make operations more conducive to wider acceptance, because local women feel more comfortable dealing with females in authority. But the percentage of females in the international security sector remains tiny at about 2% (in the civilian sector about 30%), and the role-playing notionally assigned to women creates an essentialism that few feminists are comfortable with. Admittedly, some findings show

21. Tondini, M. 'Putting an End to Human Rights Violations by Proxy: Accountability of International Organizations and Member States in the Framework of Jus Post Bellum', in Stahn, C. and J.K. Kleffner (eds), *Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace*, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008: 187–212.

22. Sion, L. 'Dutch Peacekeepers and Host Environments in the Balkans: An Ethnological Perspective'. *International Peacekeeping* 15, no.2, 2008: 201–13.

such a homogenized perception of the components of missions, whether in or out of uniform, that they are lumped together as ‘whites’, ‘foreigners on tour’, ‘united holidays’ (*vacaciones unidas*) and less flattering terms.²³ Other evidence points to the ability of locals to discriminate in their dealings, playing off foreign agencies or individuals against each other to achieve their own ends.²⁴ There may also be a correlation between acceptability ratings and length of stay: the longer a mission is in place, the fewer mistakes are tolerated, as the foreigners outstay their welcome.

What Hosts Want

It is therefore worth a reminder that locals have agency. It is, of course, erroneous to confuse perceptions with outcomes. But in so far as the outcomes of peace missions produce unintended consequences and ‘hybridities’ that fall short of mission goals, outcomes reflect local adaptations, mimicry, mockery and resistances. That is to say locals do not simply accept what the interlopers serve up. They resist or incorporate external policies into their own agendas. Engagement with local agendas and negotiation on the basis of unprivileged imposition is therefore an essential component of sustainable peace.

There are also differences in perceptions, reactions and resistances according to gender, age, location and benefits. Women have been prominent in establishing survival and coping mechanisms during and after conflict, and have been instrumental in assisting peace processes, but they are often marginalized in peacebuilding. One of the few women to be taken on as a minister in Kosovo’s interim government, Vjosa Dobruna, leader of an NGO Centre for Women and Children and Co-Administrator for the Department of Democratic Governance and Civil Society, writes about her resignation:

I sent an open letter saying I was leaving because there was no real partnership between the international community and Kosovars, and because women were being prevented from taking part in reconstruction – which was their right and responsibility. The ideal

23. Pouligny, ix.

24. Pouligny.

model for transferring power to the local people had, in my opinion, failed in practice.²⁵

Young people may be drawn to radical resistance by marginalization and lack of opportunities, as youths in Palestinian refugee camps were drawn to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.²⁶ By contrast, those living around 'secure spaces', a foreign base for example, may benefit from foreign spending of allowances and employment opportunities.²⁷ Capital cities generally benefit more in this respect than provincial and remote areas. Moreover, a coincidence of interests can emerge in peacebuilding between the neo-liberal agendas of donors and local war entrepreneurs who capture state assets for private profit, or who are adopted by the externals as part of a globalized elite or 'parachuted in' as reliable clients of neo-liberal governance.²⁸

In other words, students and practitioners have to be careful to disaggregate the phenomena of local perceptions. Nevertheless, there seem to be some common expectations that the masses interpret as desirable.

First, locals seek physical and moral security for themselves and communities. As mentioned above, interpretations differ as to what constitutes security and how it can be satisfied. In cases of mixed ethnic populations, security may be interpreted as separation rather than integration. There is, for example, a long-standing debate about the extent to which the Dayton Accords ended a conflict rather than established a peace. One line of argument that tends to get marginalized is that Dayton, however dysfunctionally it operates politically and economically, has actually allowed a significant proportion of the population to feel sufficiently secure over time to allow space for initiatives that cross borders with common economic goals,

25. Profile of Vjosa Dobruna, Hunt Alternatives Fund, The Institute for Inclusive Security, www.huntalternatives.org/pages/398_vjosa_dobruna.cfm, July 2006; author's conversation with Vjosa Dobruna, Reggio Emilia, 26 May 2005. See also, 'Women, Peace and Conflict: A Decade after Resolution 1325', special issue of *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 2, 2010.

26. Turner, 'Creating 'partners for peace''.

27. See Carnahan, M., W. Durch and S. Gilmore, 'Economic Impact of Peacekeeping'. Report for DPKO, March 2006; Higate and Henry.

28. Pugh, M. 'Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Spoils of Peace'. *Global Governance* 8, no. 4, autumn 2002: 467–82.

at local and regional levels.²⁹ A sense of predictability about social connection is more important, it can be argued, than an external quest for law and order based on state security forces (which, however much ‘reformed’, may be the object of distrust and suspicion).

Not far behind security, and closely related to it, is the quest for restoration – of rights, property and dignity. This is an expectation exceedingly difficult for external actors to achieve in highly fractured societies emerging from civil war, though property restoration measures have been tried with apparent success in the Balkans, and various efforts to establish justice, mainly criminal justice, have been attempted. Dignity is more likely to be achieved if local hosts are not expected to fit into a framework of change that is arranged from outside – rather than locals being engaged in what Duffield calls ‘unscripted conversations’ and have a role in framing their adaptation to new circumstances.

Also high on local agendas are welfare and income generation. The lack of attention to these issues is probably why coping strategies involving a variety of informal means, often coded as ‘criminal’, are employed. I have written extensively on this issue and will not recycle arguments available elsewhere.³⁰ For an interesting and convergent point of view, the UNDP-sponsored *Enabling Local Ingenuity Report* mentioned earlier is well worth reading. In a provocative albeit polemical spirit, however, I will re-emphasize that the neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes favoured by the largely unaccountable donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) (at least unaccountable to local interests) seem extremely risky because they take a long-term, if not indefinitely deferred, approach to employment issues.³¹ The World Bank has a seat in the Peacebuilding Commission; it uses trust funds to exercise leverage where it has no direct role, is widely considered as an ‘ally in peacebuilding’,³² drives the donor conferences and, backed by

29. The author’s next research programme is to examine municipal innovations across ethnic and municipal divides, on a sub-regional basis that surreptitiously looks into the current political rigidities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

30. Most recently, ‘Work, Welfare, Resistance: Liberal Peace After the Casino Crisis’, *Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding* (in press, 2010).

31. Susan Woodward has been a particularly incisive critic of IFI policies in peacebuilding, and is writing a chapter on these lines in Zaum, D. and M. Berdal (eds), *Power After Peace*, forthcoming, 2011.

32. ‘From New York to the Field: A Dialogue on Peace Operations. Report of a conference of UN member states and SRSGs, 19 June 2009’. New York: International Peace Institute, January 2010: 5.

IMF conditionalities, places state institution building at the top of its agenda so that neo-liberal political economies can be institutionalized. Clearly, the UNDP and donors have varying degrees of emphasis on what needs to be done, but the culture of structural adjustment and conditionality is pervasive. Local authorities then have to manage the tensions that arise. I even venture to suggest that any 'alliance' between the DPKO and the World Bank places peacekeepers in the position of 'guarding' a particular interpretation of political economy that they have no business doing – especially when structural adjustment replaces social contracts with fiscal contracts, and produces or reinforces a class of non-insured.³³

Conclusion

Programmes of transformation rather than adjustment are likely to discount resistance as 'spoiling'. This marginalizes local agency and 'romanticizes' (Richmond's term) the hosts as passive subjects; victimized, incapable and ready to be 'cured' of their il-liberalism. From this perspective, a problem-solving approach to accountability and local perceptions is likely to be inadequate, because it diminishes the sovereignty of those who will have to live with an inevitably untidy peace long after the peacekeepers have gone.

33. Duffield, M. 'Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 2, 2008: 145–65.

Robust Peacekeeping: a False Good Idea?

Thierry Tardy

The concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’ emerged in the late 1990s as a response to the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, where UN peacekeepers did not intervene to stop massive violations of human rights, on the alleged grounds that they were not ‘robust enough’.

In 2000, the Brahimi Report referred several times to the necessity of ‘robust peacekeeping forces’ as a lesson from past experiences. Subsequently, mandates of newly created operations have increasingly involved the idea that UN peacekeepers must be given the political and operational means to implement their mandate. In particular, the simultaneous attention given to the protection of civilians in peace missions has led the Security Council to instil a vocabulary of robustness in its resolutions. In these different cases, robustness is understood as a way to give any operation a degree of credibility, especially as regards spoilers. Robustness is supposed to allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to ensure some freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate or more broadly the peace process is taken hostage by spoilers.

Although robust peacekeeping is not a new concept and has been partially implemented in some operations (Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Lebanon), it has garnered new attention in 2008–10 with developments relating to its conceptualization. Several policy documents issued by different units of the DPKO¹ have provided definitions of the term, partly in response to critiques of confusion and lack of clarity as to

1. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations, 2008, [hereinafter, the Capstone Doctrine]; UNDPKO-DFS. *A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. DPKO-DFS, New York, 2009; and Office of Military Affairs. *DPKO-DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations, 2009.

the operational implications of robustness. Subsequently, robust peacekeeping was discussed at the 2010 session of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. The debates revealed a high degree of politicization, as well as the sensitivity of the concept of ‘robustness’ – not least among the NAM countries.

This short article aims at challenging the coherence and feasibility of the concept of robust peacekeeping. While it recognizes the necessity and virtue of a robust approach as a protection mechanism for peacekeepers, it questions the extent to which robust peacekeeping is politically acceptable and operationally viable. In particular, it looks at robust peacekeeping in the context of long-lasting constraints of contemporary peace operations – in terms of political support, availability and quality of troops, and the propensity of troop contributors to embrace a robust approach.

Definitions and Conceptual Ambiguities

There is consensus that robust peacekeeping is an ill-defined concept and that it is, in consequence, difficult to operationalize. Two different conceptions of robust peacekeeping can be distinguished: a narrow approach and a broad approach.

The narrow approach is about enabling peacekeepers to implement their mandate thanks to their robustness, their robust posture, their robust equipment, and their propensity to resort to force, if need be, in implementing their mandate. This approach is narrow in the sense that it focuses on the robustness of the peacekeepers. This definition is by and large that of the UN Capstone Doctrine, which, in its glossary of terms, defines ‘robust peacekeeping’ as ‘the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process’.² In this context, robust peacekeeping is also defined by what it is *not* – peace enforcement. Two key elements distinguish robust peacekeeping from peace enforcement: the level of the use of force (tactical for robust peacekeeping; strategic for peace enforce-

2. Capstone Doctrine, 98.

ment); and the nature of consent of the host state, which is required for robust peacekeeping but not in the case of peace enforcement.

The broad approach takes a different angle to robust peacekeeping, by looking at it in more political terms. It is defined in the UN New Partnership Agenda as a ‘robust approach to peacekeeping’, which is a ‘political and operational strategy to signal the intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of resistance from spoilers’.³ This approach significantly broadens that of the Capstone Doctrine, by recognizing that robustness cannot be confined to the peacekeepers and their ability to use force in defence of their mandate, but needs to be embedded into a broader framework that combines operational and political parameters. In this context, a ‘Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping’ issued in 2009 by the DPKO Office of Military Affairs offers an interim definition of robust peacekeeping:

a posture by a peacekeeping operation that demonstrates willingness, capacity and capability to deter and confront, including through the use of force when necessary, an obstruction to the implementation of its mandate.

The document emphasizes that robust peacekeeping is a ‘posture’ rather ‘than a specific activity’, meaning that ‘robustness [...] can be demonstrated in many ways, including the use of political dialogue’, but also ‘targeted sanctions against identified spoilers, [...] or support and incentives to national reconciliation efforts’.⁴ To a certain extent, the Concept Note seeks to reconcile the broad and narrow approaches. However, its focus tends to be more on the military/peacekeeping dimension of the operation rather than on its political element.

Overall, these documents help clarify what robust peacekeeping is and what it is not. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that these documents have not been endorsed by the UN member states, and can

3. New Partnership Agenda, 21.

4. *Ibid.*, 3.

therefore hardly be considered ‘UN policy’.⁵ Furthermore, this effort at conceptualizing robustness has given rise to several issues on the coherence of the term. Characteristic of contemporary peace operations is the difficulty of looking at them in a compartmentalized way. That makes the narrow approach of robust peacekeeping as defined in the Capstone Doctrine problematic, as it tends to single out one requirement of effectiveness without embedding it into a broader framework.

What, then, is the point of promoting robustness if no political process underlies it, if the host country is lukewarm to it, or if many key states deliberately stay away from UN operations and therefore are not engaged in implementing the concept? Within the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (also called C-34)⁶, robustness seems to have been singled out by Western states as if it were a solution to the generic problems of effectiveness of peace operations. However, large participation in UN operations, the existence of a political process backed by the Security Council and other important stakeholders, presumably equally important to the overall success of peace missions, failed to attract the same level of attention.

The limits of the narrow approach would seem to plead for the broader vision proposed by the New Partnership Agenda. There is talk of a ‘robust approach to peacekeeping’ to reflect that necessity to go beyond the robustness of the force and to adopt a more political approach to robustness. However, this approach runs the risk of diluting the concept of robustness. One talks about ‘robust peacekeeping’, ‘robust strategy’, ‘robust doctrine’, ‘robust peacebuilding’⁷ – overlooking the very meaning of the adjective ‘robust’ in each case, and the flaws of associating it with a whole range of terms not intuitively close to the idea of robustness. What Western states and the DPKO wish to promote is peacekeeping with the appropriate mandate, support, and capabilities to fulfil the mission assigned by the Security Council. Simply put, what this is all about is *effectiveness*.

5. The Capstone Doctrine states in a footnote that ‘the list [of terms of its glossary] does not provide authoritative UN definitions’, and that ‘official UN definitions are being considered in the context of the ongoing terminology deliberations of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.’ Capstone Doctrine, 100.

6. The C-34 counts 144 countries.

7. The DPKO Concept note on robust peacekeeping also talks about ‘robust support’, 3.

In reality, quite a few countries, also in the NAM, accept the idea that peacekeeping forces need to be able to ensure their security and implement their mandate, potentially through a firm posture that may imply the resort to force. Where they would disagree is with the way robustness is being framed. That is what is expressed in the 2010 C-34 report. In the end, while clarification on the meaning of robust peacekeeping is important, the risk of over-conceptualization needs also to be avoided.

Robustness In The Broader Peacekeeping Context

The concept of robust peacekeeping is extremely contentious. Within the UN, debates on robust peacekeeping have been highly politicized, also reflecting strong divergences as to the meaning and implications of the concept.

Politicization of robust peacekeeping has been evident at the C-34, where the issue was on the agenda of the 2010 session. Debates pitted the European Union group, which pushed for the idea of robustness, against the NAM, which expressed concerns about the concept and its potential implications⁸. For European states, robustness is a response to a lack of effectiveness of peace operations; it is aimed at enabling peacekeepers to protect themselves properly and to preserve the necessary freedom of manoeuvre to implement their mandate. A link is also established between robustness and the protection of civilians, which may require a robust posture and perhaps the capacity to use force. By contrast, many NAM countries see robustness as deviating from the key principles of peacekeeping and as a potential threat to the sovereignty of peace operations host countries. A parallel is implicitly drawn between robustness and a form of neo-colonialism, and with a new instrument of Western domination over countries of the South.

More fundamentally, the risk of abuse of a robust posture is invoked. What is questioned here is the distinction between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the ability of any given operation to ensure that what initially starts as robust peacekeeping does not end as peace enforcement. This leads to the question of the compatibility of robust peacekeeping with three key principles of peace operations – impartiality,

8. See Proceedings of the C34 debates, GA/PK/203, 22 February 2010, and GA/PK/204, 23 February 2010.

consent of the host state and non-resort to force. For some NAM countries, the kind of use of force that is implied by robust peacekeeping, i.e. in other cases than self-defence, is a direct challenge to the principle of non-resort to force and therefore to the very nature of UN peace operations.

This general context of North–South divide over peacekeeping issues has been further shaped by key trends in peace operations. Debates on contemporary peacekeeping cannot ignore some of its tangible characteristics, not least the question of who is doing what in peace operations. While Western states are the main financial contributors to the peacekeeping budget, they have generally been absent in terms of troop contribution since the mid-1990s. Conversely, countries of the global South have dominated UN peace operations, and have therefore to a large extent shaped the politics of peacekeeping on the ground. At the same time, despite the changes of the last decade, the decision-making process on peacekeeping has remained dominated by the Security Council and its permanent members, to the detriment of the main troop-contributing countries.

This ‘division of tasks’ feeds the North–South divide and the politicization of debates, particularly when – as is the case with robust peacekeeping – a concept is pushed by countries that are unlikely to implement it, as they are not present on the ground. Furthermore, the ‘commitment gap’ raises the question of the extent to which current troop-contributing countries have the military capabilities to be robust. Jean-Marie Guéhenno identifies three negative consequences of the absence of Western countries on peacekeeping robustness: first, there is ‘much less willingness among troop contributors to take risks’ if those risks are ‘not shared by those who make the decisions’; second, the ‘capacities available in the armed forces of the richer nations mitigate the risks of robust peacekeeping and would make it more effective’; third, ‘robust peacekeeping can work only if it is embedded in a broader political strategy’, and the ‘systematic absence [of Western states] in UN military deployments undermines the message of universal commitment that such deployments should convey.’⁹ These points make clear the diffi-

9. Guéhenno, J.-M. ‘Robust Peacekeeping: Building Political Consensus and Strengthening Command and Control’. *Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force*, New York: Center on International Cooperation, NYU, 2009: 9.

culty of confining the debate to the issue of robustness. It is only one element, among many others, of the effectiveness of peacekeeping.

These divergences led to difficult debates at the 2010 C-34 session. Some NAM members contested the term ‘robust peacekeeping’ and put forward that of ‘effective peacekeeping’¹⁰. In doing so, they were objecting that the idea of robustness could be presented as the solution to what they see as much broader problems. In the end, the C-34 report mentions neither the term ‘robust peacekeeping’ nor ‘the use of force’.¹¹

Robustness, How Feasible?

In this general political context, three issues require special attention as they directly challenge the feasibility of robustness: the nature of the requirements of robust peacekeeping, the unintended consequences of robustness, and the varying degrees of feasibility depending on the meaning of robustness.

Requirements of Robust Peacekeeping

Robust peacekeeping implies a series of political and operational requirements. By definition, the reality of robustness will be questioned if those requirements are not met. Both the DPKO ‘Concept Note on robust peacekeeping’ and the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper provide lists of such requirements.

The UN Secretariat is justified in pushing for the improvement of state capabilities and practices and setting standards in the peacekeeping domain. However, with the very ambitious list of requirements for robust peacekeeping that the UN has come up with,¹² one must ask how realistic they are, given the long-lasting constraints of contemporary peace operations. This leads back to the ‘commitment gap’ and the extent to which the current TTCs are in a position to make the necessary adjustments to meet the requirements, let alone their willingness to do so. The fact is that, with a few exceptions, the main TTCs are far from most of the requirements listed by

10. See Declaration of the Representative of Morocco on behalf of the NAM at the C34, GA/PK/203, 22 February 2010.

11. See *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, New York: United Nations, 2010, A/64/19, § 65.

12. The UN talks, among other things, about ‘modern technology’, ‘enhanced situational awareness and risk analysis’, ‘comprehensive communication strategy’ or ‘high degree of mobility’.

the DPKO. The past ten years of UN involvement in peace operations have amply demonstrated this – as regards UN overstretch, deployment and logistical problems, the level of equipment and TTC performance.

Unintended consequences of robustness

Secondly, the narrative in favour of robust peacekeeping generally assumes that robustness comes as a solution to some of the difficulties facing peace operations. Although this may be true in some circumstances, it is also worth noting that robustness involves unintended consequences that may challenge its relevance.

The DPKO Concept Note identifies a series of risks connected with robust peacekeeping.¹³ One is the risk of conflict escalation: this requires particular attention as it may imply an undesired shift from the use of force at the tactical level (which falls within robust peacekeeping) to the use of force at the strategic level (which characterizes peace enforcement). On the ground, it is no easy task to make sure that the use of force indeed remains at the tactical level and therefore stays within the boundaries of robust peacekeeping.

At the political level, the risk of loss of impartiality and legitimacy is exacerbated by the intrusive and coercive nature of robust peacekeeping. This reinforces the need to embed robust peacekeeping within a political framework that robustness is meant to serve.¹⁴ The effectiveness and legitimacy of robust peacekeeping are dependent on the level of political backing that it gets from its key stakeholders, the Security Council members, the main TCCs and PCCs, and the host state. The full backing of the host state is equally essential to the success of robust peacekeeping, in particular in confronting ‘spoilers’. But when the consent is weak, as in Sudan and the DRC, when the spoilers are backed by the government, as in Darfur, or when spoilers are either the state itself, or groups like the Hezbollah, then the very feasibility of robustness is at stake. In most UN peace missions, the level of political support and the reality of the political process are

13. See Concept Note, 3.

14. See Berdal, M. ‘The search for security: the use and utility of force in peacebuilding operation’. *Building Peace after War*. London: IISS, 2009: 100–21.

issues of permanent concern. The extent to which robustness is possible in these circumstances remains open to question.

Furthermore, altering the nature of peace operations by adopting a more openly robust posture is likely to lead to some counter-reactions – in terms of host-country level of acceptance, spoiler behaviour, impact on the local actors, or even TCC motives and behaviours that are difficult to predict. Robustness may deter some spoilers, but it may also induce reactions or new forms of disruption that would not have appeared otherwise. As Gowan and Tortolani argue, robustness creates new vulnerabilities¹⁵ that have not been clearly identified. It follows that, although robustness is presented as a solution, there may be cases where it is actually part of the problem.

Varying degrees of feasibility depending on the meaning of robustness

Thirdly, the generic term of robust peacekeeping embraces both the idea of robustness in protection of the force and robustness in defence of the mandate, which generally includes the protection of civilians as well. This amalgam is problematic, as the two types of activities are fundamentally different. Robust peacekeeping in protection of the force is aimed at ensuring a certain level of security to the peacekeepers and at deterring intermittent or continuous harassment from spoilers. It is peacekeeper-centred and is seen by many potential or actual contributors as a condition of their commitment. By contrast, robust peacekeeping in defence of the mandate and in the protection of civilians is mandate-centred, and is far more ambitious than the peacekeeper-centred approach.

The two approaches involve very different postures, operational capabilities and levels of political commitment, from the Security Council and TCCs as well as from the host authorities. In Darfur, for example, where peacekeepers have faced attacks from spoilers on a daily basis, few would contest the necessity to guarantee the protection of the force, and this conception of robustness has become broadly accepted, also by a majority of NAM states. Yet, robustness in confronting the spoilers in a coercive way

15. See Gowan, R. and B. Tortolani, 'Robust Peacekeeping and its Limitations'. *Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force*, 2009, 53.

or in implementing the mandate is far less accepted, especially by TCCs, some of which are neighbours to Sudan and would be reluctant to engage in a confrontation with state-backed spoilers.

Robustness in defence of the mandate places the operation in a very different situation. At least two issues make the difference. First, robustness in defence of the mandate increases the degree of intrusiveness into the internal affairs of the host state as well as the risk of a shift between the use of force at the tactical level and the use of force at the strategic level. Second, those changes directly impact on the nature of motives and on the degree of commitment from contributing states. Leaving aside the capabilities issue, the key question is whether troop contributors would indeed contemplate a robust posture beyond their own protection. Similarly, to what extent will host states be ready to accept robust peacekeeping operations and the associated risk to their own sovereignty? A clear example here is the case of Sudan, where President Bashir made sure that any troop contributor inclined to act 'robustly' would not participate.

In general terms, while the peacekeeper-centred approach to robustness may be broadly accepted, there is little indication of readiness from the UN member states to embrace the robust peacekeeping approach in all its dimensions. On the contrary, most current operations show a strong reluctance to take that path. True, there are some cases – as in the DRC with Indian and Pakistani contingents, or in Haiti with Brazilian peacekeepers – where robust action has been taken. However, only a very few countries are ready to assume the consequences of activities of that type over a long period. What might be better is to make a distinction between robustness in protection of the force, and robustness in defence of the mandate. Having the two notions under the same concept is counter-productive.

One broad conclusion can be drawn from this brief analysis. Robust peacekeeping may have its merits, but it can hardly be considered while leaving aside the broader peacekeeping environment and the lasting constraints facing contemporary peace operations. Those constraints may not condemn the idea of robustness, but they certainly make clear the need for extreme prudence in assuming that robust peacekeeping is the way forward.

The UN and Africa – Options for Partnership and Support

Kwesi Aning and Horname Noagbesenu

There is a deepening relationship between the AU the EU and the UN in their efforts to respond collectively to Africa's security challenges, particularly those posed by collaborative multidimensional peace support operations. The need to unravel and understand the multiple facets and dynamics of such relationships between the AU, EU and UN was captured in a UN Security Council Presidential statement of 28 March 2007.¹ Here, the UN Security Council re-affirmed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter. However, it also recognized the critical role of regional organizations such as the EU and AU in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. To appreciate the complexities of such interdependent relations, a process was initiated that sought to identify and clarify the available options, processes and procedures through which the UN could improve its support and arrangements for cooperation and coordination, especially with the AU, under Chapter VIII arrangements.²

Such clarification sought to deepen their relationship in areas of common interest, particularly in peacekeeping, by focusing on promoting and broadening the dialogue and cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU's Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). But while AU collaboration on peacekeeping with the UN has been useful, it is through the

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1. See UN Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2007/7 28 March 2007.
 2. There is a long history to UN–regional organizations relationships. Some of the most important documentation is S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) on the effectiveness of the Security Council's role in conflict prevention. This resolution called for the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the UN and sub-regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII; also S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005), which was the first resolution adopted by the Security Council on regional organizations.

EU, with its provision of consistent funding options through the African Peace Facility (APF) that the AU has managed to sustain its peacekeeping engagements in Darfur and in Somalia.

In this article we discuss some of the challenges of coordination between the UN, EU and AU in multinational and multifunctional peace support operations in Africa. These institutions are different and separate bodies, with individual comparative advantages, internal structures, capabilities, experiences and roles. However, because the AU suffers from financial and human resource constraints, the relationship among these institutions has been characterized as ‘vacillating between paternalism and partnership’.³ There is also an acceptance that the international community is ‘witnessing the emergence of a UN-AU partnership particularly in peace operations’.⁴ While this argument is correct, we would posit that the critical points are to identify where the gaps are, and to improve this relationship characterized as either ‘emerging’ or ‘unique’. It is essential to understand the challenges that such tripartite or multilateral engagements entail, and to propose schemes for improved partnerships. Some of the factors affecting such inter-organizational coordination of peace operations will be analysed here. Finally, our recommendations emphasize areas that require attention regarding efforts towards enhancing future UN-EU-AU coordination.

Situating AU, EU And UN Relations

The role and placement of regional organizations was critical during the negotiation stages of what was to become the UN. The outcome was Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which acknowledges the scope for contribution of regional arrangements but confines their role to the settlement of disputes. Despite this recognition, there is some ambiguity about the exact nature of such regional arrangements. While Article 52(1) states that nothing in the Charter precludes ‘the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action’,

3. See Murithi, T. ‘Between paternalism and hybrid operations: the emerging UN and African relationship in peace operations’. Friederich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper No. 2 on Dialogue on Globalisation, February 2007: 1.

4. Ibid.

Article 53(1), ensures the supremacy of the UN Security Council in matters of peace and security:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

To that end, Article 54 ensures that the Security Council is kept fully informed of activities undertaken by regional organizations for the maintenance of international peace and security. While the Charter offers the legal basis for interaction between the UN and regional organizations, the Council's practice has not been consistent when recognizing or authorizing the actions of an organization to lead peace operations.

As a result, from the 1990s the UN began to pay more attention to regional organizations. In January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of heads of state and asked the Secretary-General to recommend ways of strengthening the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The response was the Agenda for Peace, issued in June 1992. Here the role of regional organizations in preventive diplomacy, early warning systems for crisis prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building was highlighted, marking the birth of the concept of a 'regional-global security partnership'. In 2005, the Secretary-General's report *In Larger Freedom* recognized this emerging relationship and argued for the 'establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities' that would allow the UN to work with the AU and EU, among others, in predictable and reliable partnerships.⁵

5. See *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005; see also 'Report of the African Union – United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations', 'Prodi Report', S/2008/813 (31 December 2008) and 'Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security', S/2008/186 (7 April 2008).

Interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

The emerging partnership and challenges between the UN, EU and AU in peace operations is a relationship predominantly founded on a mutual bond characterized by resource dependency, legitimacy and sharing of emerging common values. The UN, EU and AU have different internal structures, levels of experience and resources for peacekeeping operations, and therefore different comparative advantages for peace operations in Africa, but there is a political willingness to deepen this relationship, even though these ‘unequal’ traits may impact on inter-organizational coordination. Recognition of such differential strengths has resulted in a description of this partnership as ‘an asymmetric[al] relationship’, with a caution to the AU not to descend into a ‘relationship of hybrid paternalism’.⁶ Irrespective of such concerns, the UN still remains flexible, employing comparatively efficient mechanisms for large-scale resource management, and acting with the full legitimacy of the international community. Occasionally, however, political realities and decision-making procedures do work against timely deployment and sustained engagement in areas of fragile or failed peace. Procedures for accommodating the emerging peacekeeping partnerships, and a *modus operandi* for interacting with regional organizations, are being formalized and continuously refined.⁷

The EU has at its disposal a range of tools for conflict prevention and crisis management, and is currently engaged in several missions Africa. In addition, the EU provides funding to support conflict prevention, crisis management and capacity building, through mechanisms such as the APF. However, the EU has difficulty in coordinating its member states and institutions when it comes to foreign and security policy. This creates problems in relations with third countries and international organizations. As for the other organizations, mustering resources for peace operations is difficult, affecting both decisions to deploy and long-term commitment.

6. Murithi, T. ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations: the AU Mission in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia’, *African Security Review* 17, no. 1, 2007: 72.

7. See Joint Communiqué agreed by the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 June 2007.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter underlines the roles that regional organizations can play as partners of the UN in maintaining international peace and security. This is the reason why, when the AU undertakes peace and security interventions, it perceives its actions as a contribution to the UN and the general international community, and therefore expects to be supported.⁸ However, UN Security Council responses to decisions made by other regional organizations in terms of peacekeeping have been *ad hoc*. This points up the need to discuss what exactly the term *partnership* means. This gives rise to several questions about the nature of such relationships. For example, to what extent can the UN support decisions taken by the AU outside the remit of the UN Security Council? What does ‘delegation of authority’ mean?

With the increase in the interfaces and synergies between the UN and regional organizations, the AU in particular, there appears to be recognition that the role played by both the AU and EU as components of multilateralism is desirable, feasible and necessary. One acknowledges the need for a global-regional mechanism for maintaining international peace and security – and greater involvement of the AU and EU in conflict prevention and management, in cooperation with the UN, is part of this. It is these multiple facets of engagement that underpin the vision of a ‘mutually reinforcing regional-global mechanism’ for peace and security⁹. This mechanism can be effective if there is a combination of flexibility with impartiality, and pragmatism with consistency. Such an approach could reduce the endemic uncertainties and occasional tensions between the UN, as responsible for international peace and security, and the AU, which plays a supporting role. However, much as there is recognition of the potential and reality for greater involvement by the AU and EU in conflict prevention and management in Africa, in cooperation with the UN, the real challenge is to replace the improvised, politically selective, resource-skewed approach to regionalism with a more planned, consistent yet flexible, and resource-balanced style of regional and global governance on the part of the UN Security Council.¹⁰ Recent trends has been

8. See African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.145 (VIII). In this resolution by African Heads of State and Government, it was stated *inter alia* that ‘...we will also bear in mind that in taking initiatives for the promotion of peace and security in Africa in terms of chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the AU is also acting on behalf of the international community’.

9. See UN General Assembly Security Council A/61/204 – S/2006/590, 28 July, 2006.

10. See the Prodi Panel Report, footnote 5.

moving away from the exclusive reliance on UN-commanded peace operations, in favour of ‘hybrid’ operations in which the UN and the AU cooperate in various ways over the same mission. But there are gaps in determining whether this development represents a paradigm shift.

Coordination and Consultation Mechanisms

Improved partnerships between the UN and AU assume, by extension, that there will be coordination and consultation mechanisms between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC. The AUPSC is part of a new structure that provides a clear and new paradigm on how to construct a continental security architecture. The objectives of the AUPSC include the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, and the promotion of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Furthermore, the AUPSC has been established as a standing decision-making organ intended to function as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Following the establishment of the AUPSC in March 2004, the UNSC adopted two Presidential statements,¹¹ recognizing the importance of strengthening cooperation with the AU in order to help build its capacity to deal with security challenges. This cooperation has been emphasized in a UN Security Council resolution¹² expressing support for the establishment of a ten-year capacity-building programme for the African Union.

UN, EU & AU cooperation in Peacekeeping

The EU and AU have become significant contributors to international endeavours to support states in transition from armed violence to sustainable peace, with both organizations showing remarkable growth in their commitment to peacekeeping. The contribution of both the EU and the AU lies in their intimate local knowledge, expertise in particular issue-areas, material and personnel resources. In this sense, the AU has been active in Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the DRC, Somalia and the Sudan, with substantial EU support for AMIS.

11. See UN Security Council Presidential Statement *S/PRST/2004/27* and *S/PRST/2004/44*, 19 November 2004.

12. See UN Security Council Resolution 1625, 2005.

At present, the nature and characteristics of UN–AU cooperation in peacekeeping are among most contentious issues, at least as regards the case of the AU. While the AU has started and assiduously continued with the groundwork and processes of establishing Standby Forces, this process recognizes the importance of the UN framework, both in legal terms and as to the standards to be achieved in operations and in training. The basic assumption is that the ASF will undertake peacekeeping activities with a view to handing over the mandates and responsibilities to the UN in due course. AU and regional operations should be designed with this in mind.¹³

In this context, crucial issues that need to be addressed include early planning and start-up phase of an operation, during initial deployment and pre-mandate requirements of the AU. These are to enable it to intervene before funds are made available by the ‘international community’, through assessed contributions mandated by member states or bilateral donors. Such a need for quick responses raises a critical question: how can the AU obtain the requisite funding to get African troops started immediately when there is a crisis?

With the increasing and deepening relationship between the UN and the AU, there has been a determined and rolling endeavour by several partner institutions – particularly the EU – to support Africans with a range of financing options and capacity-building schemes designed to develop and enhance the quality and quantity of either African peace operation capabilities or contribute to UN operations. Parts of these support packages have been primarily intended to create African capacity to launch, lead and sustain peacekeeping interventions under the auspices of the AU and/or one or more of its sub-regional organizations.

While the AU has shown a remarkable political will to keep the peace, there is also no doubt that peacekeeping has grown exponentially in the midst of competing political and budgetary requirements. As a consequence, the United Nations is not always able to find the funding mechanisms with the appropriate flexibility, sustainability and predictability to enable AU troops deploy quickly. To resolve this challenge, the UN, EU and AU must strive to reinforce a collective approach to funding peace-

13. See the Prodi Panel report.

keeping operations. Discussions around the issues of UN financing of peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU gained momentum in the context of the support to African peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, and the issue was then taken up in the context of the Prodi report. The AU has demonstrated the political will to tackle current and emerging conflicts, but timely responses have often been hampered by the lack of critical logistical and financial resources.

Part of the broader discourse around the AU's political will to engage in peace support operations is that when it engages in such operations – either with UN support (as in Darfur) or without (as in Somalia) – it does so in order to stabilize a potentially dangerous situation and create favourable conditions for an international peacekeeping operation, on the basis of the principles of complementarity, subsidiarity and collective solidarity. It is, therefore, critical to examine existing institutional arrangements that sustain the capacities of the AU to respond more effectively to new and emerging international realities and global challenges.

Building Capacity For AU Peace Support Operations

Since the mid-1990s, *capacity-building* has become a buzzword of choice among external agencies seeking to support their partners. While understandings of this term differ, capacity-building should go beyond what it is currently perceived as: basically providing training to include the combination of factors and activities focused on the improvement of an organization's performance in relation to its mission, working environment and practical resources. Capacity-building becomes necessary when various parts of an organization and its operational practices and processes fall short of delivering the required resources (human, financial and logistical). The primary goals of such processes are to increase organizational effectiveness and nurture ownership.

It was in recognition of this capacity gap within the AU's peacekeeping ability that the 2005 UN World Summit called for the 'forging of predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations' and 'a strong African Union'. The Summit expressed its 'support for the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capac-

ity-building with the African Union'. Furthermore the Security Council called on 'states and international organizations to contribute to strengthening the capacity of [...] African regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization'.¹⁴ In the case of the AU, the aspect of its peace and security architecture that has been targeted by most partners for concerted capacity-building assistance and support has been the ASF, which undertakes peace support operations. There is recognition however, that while external initiatives have helped to improve African peace support capacities, the level of external assistance has been lower than expected, and has not always focused on key African concerns. In particular, the AU has not always been fully involved in determining the nature and scope of such initiatives.

The UN modalities for supporting AU's Peacekeeping Capacity Building were set out in a 2004 report of the Secretary-General.¹⁵ This resulted in the DPKO beginning, in 2006, a process to 'implement a comprehensive programme of support for African peacekeeping capacities' and 'further develop the guiding principles for strengthening cooperation with regional arrangements. The objective is to support the AU in the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture through the establishment of the ASF as envisaged in the African Union's paper 'Vision 2010'.

In this connection, the DPKO has emphasized the need to reflect the requirements of multidimensional peacekeeping and integrated planning and to ensure that the long-term approach is taken into account in the AU's planning for peacekeeping.

In order to accelerate the UN's commitment to support African peacekeeping capacity building, the DPKO, through the AU Peacekeeping Support Team (AU PST), is providing expertise and transfer of technical know-how to the AU Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD). This collocation of UN staff in the operational structures of the AU is

14. UN Security Council Resolution 1631, 2005.

15. See 'Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity', 30 November 2004 (A/59/591) and the subsequent UN World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, which set the context for the UN's 10-year capacity-building programme for the AU.

innovative. The AUPST, which became operational in January 2007, focuses on three priority areas: *mission planning*, *mission management*, and *logistic and resource management*, within the overall context of an integrated, inclusive and long-term capacity-building engagement.

In parallel, the EU has an ongoing contribution to the enhancement of AU peacekeeping capacity and its long-term capacity-building. There is no doubt that there will be a need for continued collaborative work by UN DPKO, the EU and the AU's PSOD to develop a longer-term training implementation plan to support the operational development of the ASF in a progressive manner. This is partly done through the 2008-2010 EU-sponsored AMANI-AFRICA cycle, aimed at supporting the AU in building its multidimensional peace operations management capacity.

Conclusion

Collaborative peacekeeping endeavours with the UN and the AU are clearly desirable, despite the challenges remaining with both the political and strategic calculations of all the institutions involved and the operational challenges of placing troops in theatre. Nevertheless, thanks to the interest of these institutions in responding to glaring cases of atrocities and preventing their recurrence, there is a general belief that such collaborative processes are bound to continue.

China's Influence on the Future of UN Peacekeeping

Zhao Lei

China has dramatically expanded its presence in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) for 20 years. It has played a constructive role in peacebuilding operations, enabling China to integrate into the international community and assuring the world of China's goodwill and intention to become a responsible power.¹ As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is currently contributing much-needed personnel, financial as well as political support for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As a rising power with global influence, China is strategically building its overall peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacity and is exploring how to use its capacities for peace endeavours.

China: the Significant Actor in UNPKO

The year 2010 marks the 20th anniversary of the participation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in UNPKO and the 10th anniversary of the participation of the Chinese police force in such operations. According to China's Ministry of National Defence and its Ministry of Public Security:

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1. This contribution uses the term 'peacekeeping' operations to refer to the whole spectrum of operations authorized by the UN (under Chapters VI and VII) to monitor ceasefires and/or support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, bringing peace and security into focus. In practice, the objectives of peacekeeping operations have ranged from merely maintaining the *status quo* to a far more ambitious approach of managing change. 'Peacebuilding' operations generally combine political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict, laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations, 2008, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbops/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf; Hanna Ojanen ed., *Peacekeeping–Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future*, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2006, http://www.upi-fia.fi/assets/publications/-var-www-html-customers-wwwupi-fiafi-doc-UPI_raportti_14.pdf

Up to the end of March 2010, the PLA has contributed peacekeepers over 15,000 persons/times to 18 UN peacekeeping missions worldwide [...] The Chinese peacekeeping troops have built and maintained over 8,000 kilometres of road, constructed 230-odd bridges and given medical treatment to patients for 60,000 persons/times in the UN peacekeeping mission areas, playing a positive role in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes, maintaining the regional safety and stability, and facilitating the economical and social development in some countries.²

[From 12 January 2000 to 12 January 2010] China sent 1,569 police officers to carry out peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan and Haiti. They have had no casualties, no discipline violations and never left in the middle of a mission (8 Chinese peacekeepers died in the Haiti earthquake on 13 January 2010) [...] Chinese police officers have helped crack down on local crimes, protect human rights and rebuild local enforcement teams. They also have undertaken tasks of patrolling, community safeguarding and investigations. [...] They have made a great contribution to regional peace and stability, as well as people's lives and safety.³

Concurrent to the sharp increase in China's contribution to UNPKO since the end of the Cold War, the Western powers have been withdrawing or reducing their commitments to UNPKO, to be replaced by smaller countries. In the context of this change, playing a significant role in UNPKO is perceived as a rare opportunity to display 'China's charm'. In 2006, China's Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, stated 'China felt it is the right time for us to fill this vacuum. We want to play our role.'⁴ To a certain extent, China's growing contributions fitly and fully meet the demands of complex and challenging peacekeeping activities. As of June 2010, China was the 15th largest contrib-

2. PLA Daily. 'PLA Contributes a lot to UN Peacekeeping Operations'. 26 April 2010.

3. China.org.cn. 'A decade of China's Peacekeeping missions'. 18 January 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/world/haitiquake/2010-01/18/content_19262239.htm

4. *The Washington Post*. 'China Filling Void Left by West in UN Peacekeeping', 24 November 2006.

utor to UN missions, providing more troops, police and military observers than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council (the 'P-5').⁵

On 20 November 2009, Wei Yanwei, vice-director of the Peacekeeping Office of China's Ministry of National Defence, avowed that if the UN should request the sending of combat units, the Peacekeeping Office would timely submit the recommendations to the military and national decision-makers. Wei added that, concerning the possibility of sending combat units, China would take into account its national defence policy and the response of the 'international community', as well as the wishes of host countries.⁶ China would have to be extremely cautious about such deployment. Some Chinese analysts maintain that 'the areas currently in need of peacekeeping are suffering from turmoil at the local level without any serious conflict involved. Even if China sends combat troops it won't be of much use, because engineering and medical aid are what the locals need most.'⁷

China's Interests and Motivations in UNPKO

China has reiterated its official commitment to UNPKO in its White Paper for National Defence since 2004. It has consistently supported and actively participated in peacekeeping operations consistent with the spirit of the UN Charter.⁸ China's peacekeeping behaviour is motivated by diverse interests, of which three main points are highlighted here.

To begin with, participation in UNPKO has served to raise China's international profile. Acutely aware of its global image and reputation, Chinas see UNPKO as an effective way to project a more benign and positive image to the world. By contributing, China can no longer be

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5. China has committed 2,117 military and police individuals in UNPKO; France 1,706; the Russian Federation 291; the United Kingdom 281; the USA only 86. See UNDPKO. *Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations*. United Nations, 30 April 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/apr10_2.pdf
 6. Xinhua. 'China Will Consider Sending Combat Units under the Request of the United Nations'. 20 November 2009.
 7. *China Daily*. 'Chinese combat troops 'can join UN peacekeeping''. 7 July 2010.
 8. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. *China's National Defence in 2004*. December 2004, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm>

labelled as a 'dissatisfied power' or 'irresponsible power'. One indicator of Beijing's growing tangible and concrete contribution with respect to UNPKO is seen in its efforts at improving its training capabilities. In June 2009, the Peacekeeping Centre of China's Ministry of National Defence was formally set up, which benefits the PLA to further improve its peacekeeping training and exchange with foreign militaries. In addition, all military observers accept training in the PLA Nanjing International Relations Academy, and all civilian police and armed police receive training at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Centre in the Chinese People's Armed Police Forces Academy.⁹

China is an ancient civilized *nation* with a deep traditional influence. Its people therefore sincerely hope that the foreign policy of China today can be equated with that of a responsible power with a *peace-loving* culture. The Chinese try hard to avoid giving an impression of their country as a selfish and egotistical 'giant'. As Dai Shaoan, vice-director of the Peacekeeping Office put it, 'Wherever they go or whatever they do, [Chinese peacekeepers] always bear in mind that they are messengers of peace, representing China [...]. To win hearts and minds, you need to devote your own hearts and minds, and that is exactly what our peacekeepers are doing.'¹⁰

Secondly, participation in UNPKO has served to bolster China's relations with host countries as well as with Washington and other Western governments. On 30 June 2008, former US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, met Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, and proposed that 'the two armed forces should enhance cooperation on humanitarian operations and peacekeeping missions.'¹¹ On 28 January 2010, Chinese peacekeeping police and US troops carried out their first joint patrol in Haiti. As part of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a tactical team of 10 Chinese riot police and two squads from the US 82nd Airborne Divi-

9. China is currently promoting the capability to train Formed Police Units (FPU), and will build a multifunctional FPU training facility at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Centre (CPCTC). Interview with senior official of CPCTC, Langfang, 19 May 2010.

10. *People Daily*. 'Peacekeeping: a Rising Role of China's PLA'. 24 July 2007.

11. *China Daily*. 'China, US Armed Forces Vow to Enhance Cooperation'. 1 July 2008.

sion conducted a patrol in Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti.¹² The joint effort has a special symbolic significance: the most developed Western country and the largest developing country have common interests in the maintenance of world peace. Moreover, the increasing military contacts in peace operations provide lines of communication to promote military transparency and political understanding so as to reduce the possibility of accidental confrontations. There is also a huge potential for closer peacekeeping cooperation between China and other major Western countries. China is currently exploring the prospects for working with the USA and the EU to help build Africa's peacekeeping capacity.

Thirdly, participation in UNPKO has served to protect Chinese interests abroad. With the growing globalization of its interests, public and private, China needs stable overseas markets for securing a sustainable development. As some observers note, 'China is in increasing need for natural resources in order to sustain its role as the workshop of the world and requires stable markets where it can afford its products'¹³; 'Instability in [...] energy producing parts of Africa and the Middle East is clearly not in China's interests.'¹⁴

Chinese peacekeepers have witnessed the remarkable strides of China's 'Going Abroad' strategy (*zouchuqu zhanlue*) since the late 1980s. Today, Chinese organizations, enterprises and citizens have been increasingly going abroad, and have been repeatedly harassed, attacked or kidnapped by 'terrorists' and criminals in foreign countries. In the country of residence, Chinese peacekeepers collaborate with Chinese institutions and organizations to protect the rightful interests of Chinese people and enterprises. For example, in Liberia, Chinese peacekeepers took the initiative to rescue the Chinese fishermen robbed by pirates. In East Timor, Chinese peacekeepers rescued the wounded and dying Chinese businessmen

12. *China Daily*. 'China, US Peacekeepers Conduct Joint Patrol in Haiti'. 29 January 2010.

13. Hellström, J. *Blue Berets under the Red Flag: China in the UN Peacekeeping System*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009: 34, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foit2772.pdf>

14. Green, M.J. 'Democracy and the Balance of Power in Asia'. *The American Interest* 2, no.1, 2006: 101.

attacked by mobs, and donated blood for them.¹⁵ In short, Chinese peacekeepers are guardians of China's overseas national interests.

China stands to gain a lot from its peacekeeping contribution, and that in turn encourages it to contribute further. In 2001 and 2002, only about 100 Chinese peacekeepers served in UN missions, significantly less than the other P-5. However, from March 2004 to August 2006, China historically became the largest contributor. Since September 2006, China and France have ranked as the biggest contributors of personnel to UNPKO, leaving the other three P-5 countries far behind.

The Irreplaceable Stakeholder In International Peacebuilding

Along with the wide acceptance of peacebuilding by the international community, China is beginning to embrace it as an indispensable stakeholder.

Generally speaking, while peacekeeping aims to realize negative peace (in the sense of no armed conflicts between or within countries), peacebuilding is about creating or restoring stable political, economic and social conditions for long-lasting peace. The coexistence of these two missions reflects the functional shifts in peace operations: the changing nature of the operational environment, with a more complex link between diplomacy, military action and humanitarian intervention; the changing status of national government in global governance, from leadership to co-partnership; and the changing understanding of the concept of security, from state security to civilian security, etc. However, it must be borne in mind *that* China and Western developed countries have different perspectives on the implications of peacebuilding, as shown in Table 1 below.

15. Lei, Z. 'China is a Responsible Power in UNPKO Arena'. *China Report* 72, no. 2 2010: 41.

Table 1. Different Perspective on the Implications of Peacebuilding

	Western perspective	China's perspective
Objective	Liberal democracy priority	Development priority
Focus	Good governance	Good government
Principle	Democracy promotion	Assistance orientation
	Necessary intervention	Non-intervention
Strategic Culture	Pre-emptive	Reactive
Method	Top-down & bottom-up management: Set for new constitution; hold national election; build multi-party system; strengthen civil society, etc.	Top-down management: Strengthen state capacity; enhance national identification and national reconciliation; promote economic recovery etc.
Defect	Challenge local ownership	Lack of public participation

In practice, Western countries adhere to the 'liberal peace' agenda: the pursuit of economic and political reform alongside measures to resolve the conflict. Peace is to be ensured by liberal democracy and market economy.¹⁶ By contrast, China maintains that liberal democracy is not the panacea, and that a 'one-size-fits-all' model does not exist. Security and development are intrinsically linked, and peacebuilding would be impossible without achievements in development. Therefore, as explained by Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, China advocates 'the early realization of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the promotion of the repatriation, resettlement and the economic recovery of refugees and displaced persons constitute the short-term objectives of peacebuilding. The long-term objectives, however, are the eradication of poverty, development of economy as well as a peaceful and rewarding life for people in the post-conflict countries and regions.'¹⁷

16. See Richmond, O. *The Transformation of Peace (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies)*, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2005.

17. China.org.cn. 'Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to UN at the Security Council on the Topic of 'Peace-Building: towards a Comprehensive Approach''. 2 February 2001, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/peacekeeping/t29428.htm>

As a traditionally wary country, China recognizes that peacebuilding is even more complex than peacekeeping. It is not in favour of peacebuilding conflated with military action, humanitarian intervention or regime change, and vigorously opposes any operation of state-building. China takes a firm stance on the possibility of a 'Western right' to intervene in peacebuilding, and tries hard to curb the development of the interventionist trend. This demonstrates the subtle but significant shift of Chinese strategic culture: from passively satisfying international norms to actively shaping them.

China's Comparative Advantages in Peacebuilding

China has greatly contributed to the settlement of global issues – poverty relief, human development, regional security and global stability in particular. Moreover, it enjoys some *comparative advantages* in peacebuilding. First of all, China takes a pragmatic approach to peacebuilding. Its view of sovereignty and intervention is not fixed: China's position on peacebuilding has evolved over time in an incremental situation-specific manner. As it is more engaged in fragile and conflict-affected countries, China has to re-think how to safeguard or stabilize its interests at the global level and adapt its principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to new realities.

China holds that the norm of non-interference does not provide cover for 'genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'. The pragmatic approach has emerged more evidently in recent years over the degree to which China is being 'socialized' into the international community through processes of adaptation and learning.¹⁸ In 2003, in response to growing instability in the *DRC* and in Liberia, China's Ambassador to the UN, Zhang Yishan, argued that 'under certain conditions, the UN should intervene in conflict areas earlier, faster and more forcefully'.¹⁹

Secondly, China stands for stronger multilateralism, which is beneficial for gaining wide support for its dedication to peace. Initially, multilateralism

18. Johnston, A.I. 'Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s'. *The China Journal*, No. 35, 1996: 27–61.

19. China.cn.org. 'Statement by H.E. Ambassador ZHANG Yishan, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Fourth Committee of the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly, on UN peacekeeping', 16 October 2003, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/yshy/t56587.htm>

was China's answer to counter US unilateralism and hegemony. When the UN authority is challenged, China is willing to act as a 'defender' of the UN system.²⁰ More recently, China has acknowledged the great benefits and potential of the UN system, and has begun to pursue all-round multilateral diplomacy.

China *reiterates* that the UN is at the core of multilateralism, and plays an irreplaceable role in international cooperation to ensure global security. Such a role can only be strengthened and must not in any way be weakened.²¹ To this end, China sees its contribution to peacebuilding as a way to strengthen the UN regime, and firmly insists that 'the UN is the best venue to practice multilateralism, and an effective platform for collective actions to cope with various threats and challenges.'²²

Thirdly, China has the advantage of a multifaceted identity. It has developed its own definition of dual national identities: rising great power *and* the largest developing country. This means it can behave as a developing country which, like many such countries, can contribute personnel to peacekeeping and peacebuilding – but, unlike them, also has a voice and the right to set agendas in the UN Security Council. China feels obliged to take the interests of Third World countries into account, and its seat in the Security Council ensures that its voice on peacebuilding will be heard within international politics.

Therefore, in peace operations, China can act as a connector between Western and Third World countries and play a bridging role between developed and developing countries. More importantly, China's growing

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20. Deng, Y. and T.G. Moore, 'China Views Globalization: Towards a New Great Power Politics?'. *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3, 2004, 126; Kim, S.S. 'China and the United Nations', in E. Economy and M. Oksenberg (eds), *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999: 61.
 21. China.cn.org. 'Build toward a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity, Speech by President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations Summit, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN', 14 September 2005, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t212915.htm>
 22. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 'Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reform', 7 June 2005, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t199318.htm>

participation grants political credibility to peacebuilding missions, and tempers the host government's suspicions that the missions are dominated by Western countries.

Lastly, Chinese peacekeepers are well qualified to do hard work in severe and dangerous mission areas, and the *impartiality of Chinese peacekeepers* is much appreciated by host countries. As Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang point out, on the basis of their substantial field research and interviews, 'Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping operation.'²³ To date, no allegation of misconduct has been lodged against Chinese peacekeepers. But the most attractive strength of Chinese peacekeepers as assessed by Chinese people is that they adhere firmly to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of host countries.

China's Ongoing Contributions to Peacebuilding

Though peacekeeping and peacebuilding are different activities, they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. China constructively participates in all aspects of the creation of peacebuilding operations.

Firstly, China has been increasing its peacebuilding tasks in peacekeeping operations. In recent years, some of activities of UNPKO have also included peacebuilding tasks to varying degrees. Recognizing the needs of civilian populations marginalized from access to health care as well as the fact that the origin of conflicts is usually intimately linked to under-development, Chinese peacekeepers focus on providing critical engineering, transportation, and medical services, such as rehabilitating roads and providing essential healthcare services to UN staff as well as to the local population, which opens up the possibility for local people to contribute to their own development. China has also deployed well-drilling platoons to Africa. On 12 December 2009, after more than 20 days of drilling, the third batch of the Chinese engineering contingent in Darfur finally drilled

23. Gill, B. and C. Huang. *China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implication*. Stockholm: SIPRI Policy paper, 2009, p 25.

clean-water wells.²⁴ So far, six well have been successfully drilled, contributing notably to the alleviation of water shortages in the region.²⁵

Further, China is enhancing the capacity of its peacekeepers to carry out civilian protection. The three training facilities have arranged courses to ensure that peacekeepers have the appropriate skills and knowledge, especially linguistic, to carry out civilian protection tasks, and that they have a deeper understanding of the historical, political and cultural dynamic of conflicts. Because civilian tasks have expanded in contemporary missions, China is strengthening its civilian deployment capacity with expertise in security, rule of law, development and human rights, to compensate for the function defects of military personnel. In addition, in order to cooperate with Chinese peacekeepers in *Disarmament*, Demobilization and Reintegration, Chinese enterprises contribute in hiring former combatants to solve the problem of local unemployment and accelerate their reintegration.

In addition to the above-mentioned contributions in the field of peacekeeping, China is seeking to explore and broaden its peacebuilding endeavours. In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao promulgated the 'New Historic Missions', which ordered the PLA to develop the capabilities necessary to protect China's interests at home and abroad. This parallels the PLA's growing interest in expanding its MOOTW (*Military Operations Other Than War*) – such as counter-piracy, disaster response and humanitarian relief, in China and abroad.²⁶ On 12 May 2009 the first Disaster Prevention and Reduction Day was celebrated in China. The General Staff Headquarters of the PLA announced that the PLA had established an 'armed force system' for MOOTW, consisting of five specialized forces: flood and disaster relief force; post-earthquake emergency rescue force; emergency rescue force for nuclear, chemical and biological disasters; emergency relief force for transportation facilities; and international peacekeeping force.²⁷

24. *PLA Daily*. 'Chinese Peacekeepers to Darfur Drill Two Drinking Water Wells'. 17 December 2009.

25. *Global Times*. 'Chinese Soldiers Hone Skills on Frontlines of Peace', 10 May 2010.

26. Gill and Huang. *China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping*, 15.

27. *PLA Daily*. 'PLA constructs MOOTW arms force system'. 14 May 2009.

China's counter-piracy involvement off the Horn of Africa exemplifies its peacebuilding contribution. Piracy emerged in Somalia as a consequence of civil war, poverty and the impossibility of finding gainful employment. In 2009, Somali pirates carried out 217 attacks, 47 vessels were hijacked and 867 crewmembers were taken hostage. As of late 2009, Somali pirates were holding captive 12 large ships with 263 crewmembers aboard.²⁸ Under these circumstances, China has expanded its patrol zone in piracy-hazardous regions off Somalia. It has been approved to lead the coordination of international anti-piracy patrols, which means that China will need to send more than the three ships it keeps deployed off the Horn of Africa to protect the vital trade routes linking Asia to Europe.²⁹

Finally, participation in disaster prevention and reduction is another significant aspect of China's peacebuilding efforts. China suffers the most natural disasters of all countries. On 11 March 2009, the Chinese government released a White Paper, 'China's Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction', focusing on China's international cooperation in disaster prevention and reduction.³⁰ *Shortly afterwards*, on 14 November 2009, the China International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR) passed the IEC (INSARAG External Classification) of heavy rescue teams, becoming the 12th heavy rescue team in the world and the second in Asia. The CISAR is engaged in its expansion and will be increased to 480 members with new equipment by the end of 2010. The development of CISAR will contribute greatly to China's crisis response and management as well as to international humanitarian relief.

Conclusion

To China, the rise of a country means the rise of its comprehensive power, with soft power standing equal to hard power. China's contribution to world

28. Rusnavy.com. 'EU Applauded China's Intention to Lead International Counter-piracy Activities', 29 January 2010, http://rusnavy.com/news/othernavies/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=8614&print=Y

29. By committing to provide an 'enduring' presence in the corridor, China will be eligible to lead as part of a new rotating chairmanship, which will switch every 3–4 months. See *Global Times*. 'China to Lead Anti-piracy Patrols off Somali Coast'. 28 January 2010.

30. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 'China's Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction'. 11 March 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2009-05/11/content_17753558_8.htm

peace lies in the global multilateral but effective way to enhance its soft power by means of, or in the form of, hard power. Through these efforts, China's good image as an aid donor, peace contributor, conflict mediator, emergency rescuer, and even initiator of new institutions, coupled with the attractiveness of its development model, allows China to accelerate the pace of its peaceful rise.

China's contribution in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is likely to grow as it begins to feel more comfortable with such activities. On the other hand, and not least *after* the 2010 *Haiti earthquake*, ensuring the safety of peacekeepers in mission areas has become a top concern. For 20 years, China has paid a heavy price in the cause of world peace: the lives of eight military officers and eight police officers sacrificed for peacekeeping operations. In UN history, the failure of many peacekeeping operations has often stemmed from the fact that the casualties far exceeded the limits tolerable to the contributing countries.

In sum, the shift of China's role and the promotion of its status in peacekeeping and peacebuilding reflect the evolution of China's national identity and adjustment of its peace strategy. Despite the challenges, peace operations offer opportunities to buttress China's national interests and extend its influence overseas. Compared to other diplomatic measures, peacekeeping and peacebuilding stand out as relatively low-cost ways in which to fulfil China's commitment to world peace.

Annexes

UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar

Wednesday, 23 June 2010 and Thursday, 24 June 2010

Programme

Wednesday, 23 June 2010

Opening Session

Welcome address: Ambassador Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and David Haeri, Head of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York

Overview of seminar objectives and programme: Dr Thierry Tardy, Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and ACCORD

Session 1: The ‘New Horizon’ and Beyond

Moderator: Yvonne Kasumba, African Standby Force, Civilian Planning and Coordination Officer, African Union, Addis Ababa

Presentation: Rebecca Jovin, Policy Planning Officer, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York

Session 2: Managing Consent – the New Variable?

Moderator: Dr Gillian Cull, Strategic Planner, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Operations, New York

Presentation: Professor Ian Johnstone, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts

Discussant: Dr Almut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin

Discussant: Dr Benjamin de Carvalho, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Session 3: Expanding and Engaging TCCs, PCCs and Civilian Contributors: Towards a Capability-driven Approach to Peacekeeping

Moderator: Lieutenant General Randhir K. Mehta, United Service Institute of India

Presentation: Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and ACCORD

Presentation: Professor Donald C.F. Daniel, Core Faculty, Security Studies Program, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC

Discussant: Dr Lei Zhao, Associate Professor, Deputy Director, International Relations Institute for International Strategic Studies, The Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Discussant: Dr Albrecht Schnabel, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Session 4: Accountability and Credibility: Assessing Host Population Perceptions & Expectations

Moderator: Roxaneh Bazergan, Policy and Planning Officer, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York

Presentation: Professor Michael Pugh, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford,

Discussant: Professor Alcides Costa Vaz, University of Brasilia

Discussant: Vincenza Scherrer, UNSSR Project Coordinator, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Thursday, 24 June 2010

Session 5: Robust Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians

Moderator: Col (GS) Jacques Baud, Head Policy and Doctrine, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Office of Military Affairs, New York

Presentation: Dr Thierry Tardy, Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Discussant: Annika Hilding-Norberg, Project Leader, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm

Discussant: Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, Research Associate, Centre Thucydide, University of Paris 2

Session 6: The UN and Africa – Options for Partnership and Support

Moderator: Dr William J. Durch, Senior Associate, Director of Future of Peace Operations Program, The Stimson Center, Washington, DC

Presentation: Horname Noagbesenu, Senior Legal Officer, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC), Accra

Discussant: Eric Berman, Managing Director, Small Arms Survey, Geneva

Discussant: Capt (Navy rtd) Johan Potgieter, Senior Researcher, Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

Wrap-up Discussion & Closing Session

Moderators: Cedric de Coning and Dr Thierry Tardy

Closing remarks: David Haeri, Head of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UNDPKO, New York

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Beyond the ‘New Horizon’

With over 120,000 deployed personnel across 16 missions, and at a cost of approximately USD 8 billion per year, the scale of UN peacekeeping in 2010 is unprecedented. In July 2009, the UN secretariat released the non-paper ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.’ Since then, a dialogue has taken place between the Secretariat, the member states and regional partners, that has helped identify a set of common priorities to strengthen peacekeeping. However, several important issues of contemporary peacekeeping practices were not explored in depth in the context of the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper. Others have emerged subsequently.

It is with such issues in mind that the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, organized the ‘UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar’ in Geneva in June 2010. The objective was to facilitate a dialogue among the research and policy community, and to stimulate frank discussion on the range of factors most likely to influence and direct peacekeeping developments over the next few years. This report is an edited volume of the contributions prepared for the seminar and covers the following topics:

- Managing consent by host governments and parties to a conflict
- Increasing the quantity and quality of civilian and military personnel available for UN peacekeeping missions
- The role of host population perceptions of and expectations from UN peacekeeping
- The challenges of conceptualizing and operationalizing doctrinal approaches such as ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘protection of civilians’
- Future options for partnership and support between the UN and the AU
- The role of China in UN peacekeeping

